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APA Deference After IndependentLiving Center

Why Informal Adjudicatory Action
Needs a Hard Look
Brietta R. Clark'

H

and Medicaid beneficiaries have
providers,
advocates, ride
EALTHoncare
ever since the Supreme Court's decision
been
a rollercoaster

to grant certiorari in the case of Douglas v. Independent Living Center of

Southern Cahifornia,Inc.' The Court granted cert on the question of whether
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries could sue in federal court to challenge
cuts to California's Medi-Cal reimbursement rates. Medi-Cal is the Medicaid
program in California. The plaintiffs alleged that the rate cuts violated federal
access and quality protections in the rate-setting provisions of the Medicaid Act
(the "Act").' In light of studies documenting provider shortages for Medi-Cal
patients, providers and beneficiaries worried that the rate cuts would exacerbate
access problems by causing more providers to leave the Medi-Cal program
or to refuse to treat Medi-Cal patients. Plaintiffs also pointed to problems in
the rate-setting process because of the State's failure to consider statutorily
required factors prior to proposing the new rates.
The Medicaid Act does not create an express cause of action for such
challenges, so plaintiffs have used the Supremacy Clause to try to prevent cuts
by arguing that the rates conflict with, and thus are preempted by, federal law.
This strategy has been successful among lower courts, so many feared that
the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari on this procedural question
signaled its willingness to eliminate this avenue for challenging cuts in federal
court.4 Despite the significant rights at stake and the attention received from

1 Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CaliforniaJ.D., University of Southern
California Law School; B.A., University of Chicago.
2 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc. (Indep. Living Ctr.), 132 S. Ct.
1204 (2012).

3 Id. at

1207-08.

4 See infra Part I.B.
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numerous interested parties who filed amicus briefs, the Court ultimately
did not answer the question presented. In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court
decided that the question should be remanded to the Ninth Circuit due to
"changed circumstances."s The changed circumstances to which the Court
referred were subsequent approvals of the state's payment cuts by the federal
agency charged with Medicaid oversight, the Centers for Medicaid and
Medicare Services (CMS). At the time the suit was originally brought, the
state legislature had enacted the cuts, but they had not yet been approved by
CMS. The Court noted that this federal approval may change the procedural
question because federal agency action is subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).6 Plaintiffs' right to seek judicial review
under the APA was viewed as relevant to question of whether they should also
be able to sue under the Supremacy Clause.
The Court's decision to reframe and remand the question has generated
confusion, with parties on both sides of the dispute offering different
interpretations of Independent Living Center.7 Providers, beneficiaries, and
advocates viewed the decision as a win because, by not deciding the question,
the Supreme Court effectively preserved plaintiffs'rights to challenge state cuts
in federal court using the Supremacy Clause. On the other hand, the Court's
explanation contained dicta speculating that CMS approval would make it
harder to challenge the cuts. Citing Chevron, USSA., Inc. v. NaturalResources

Defense Council,Inc.,' the majority noted that courts ordinarily apply deference
when reviewing agency action under the APA. California officials quickly
seized on this dicta, interpreting it as a message to lower courts to defer to
CMS and labeling Independent Living Center a win for states. Given the strong
financial incentives shared by states and the federal government in cutting
Medicaid costs, states view CMS as an important ally, and after Independent
Living Center, they expect CMS approval to shield them from federal court
scrutiny.
Because Independent Living Center's discussion about deference was merely
dicta, its import is uncertain. But the way this dicta is being interpreted is a cause
for concern. Last year, in ManagedPharmacy Care v. Sebelius,' the Ninth Circuit

invoked Independent Living Center in applying a very deferential standard to
uphold a new round of Medi-Cal rate cuts approved by CMS. The Ninth

5

Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 1207-08.

6 Id. at i2o; see Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § so, 6o Stat. 237, 243
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of5 U.S.C.).
7 See Brietta R. Clark, TBe (In)decision of Douglas v. ILC: The Relevance of CMS Approval in
Challengesto MedicaidPayment Cuts, HEALTH CARE JUSTICE BLOG (Feb. 29,2012, 12:11 PM), http://
healthcarejusticeblog.org/2012/o2/us-supreme-cour.html [hereinafter Clark, The (In)decision of
Douglas v.ILCI (quoting recent commentary on the decision).
8 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.Natural Res. Def.Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9 Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F 3 d 1235 (9 th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-253,
2014WL 1o24u (U.S.Jan. 13, 2014).
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Circuit reversed the district court's injunctions, and it ignored much of the
evidence that led the district court to find California's rate-setting process and
CMS's approval arbitrary and capricious."o Managed Pharmacy Carerepresents
a stark divergence from the robust judicial review that the Ninth Circuit had
historically applied to state Medicaid cuts.
Most of the coverage about these cases has focused on the implications
for health care access, and health care advocates are justifiably concerned
about what a more deferential approach by courts could mean for Medicaid
access going forward." Judicial review has been an essential protection and last
resort for providers and beneficiaries challenging illegal state cuts.12 Medicaid
reimbursement has always been an easy target for state officials looking for a
quick fix for budgetary problems, which means they often cut rates without any
consideration of the impact such cuts will have on access and quality, as required
by federal law. 'This latest dispute in California deserves special attention
because the Ninth Circuit has historically been the most protective ofMedicaid
patients and providers in these challenges, and it has been particularly active in
defining federal rate-setting requirements. Thus the Ninth Circuit's recent shift
to a more deferential approach does not portend well for Medicaid access suits
in California or nationwide. In fact, as this Article was in the editing stages, the
Ninth Circuit rejected a request to rehear Managed Pharmacy Care en banc,"
the Supreme Court denied an appeal by providers,14 and current challenges to
Medi-Cal payment cuts seemed to be losing steam. 5
This Article, however, focuses on the administrative law implications of
Independent Living Center, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in Managed
Pharmacy Care. I suggest that this interpretation is troubling from a broader
administrative law perspective because of the unquestioned deference it seems
to endorse for informal adjudicatory actions, like an agency's approval of state
Medicaid financing decisions. The amount of deference courts should give to
agency action is a perpetually challenging question in administrative law, and
much of the scholarly debate about deference has focused on rulemaking and
formal adjudication. The APA sets forth certain procedural requirements for
io See infra Part III.
ni See 9th US. CircuitCourt Upholds State's Planto CutMedi-CalRates, CALIFORNIAHEALTHLINE (May 28, 2013), http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2oi 3/5/28/gth-us-circuit-courtupholds-states-plan-to-cut-medi-cal-rates.
12 See generally, Brietta R. Clark, MedicaidAccess, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the
Obama AdministrationIs UnderminingItsOwn Health Reform Goals,55 How.L.J.77i (2012) [hereinafter Clark, MedicaidAccess] (reviewing the role of courts, states, and federal regulators in Medicaid
payment suits brought over several decades).
13 Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 76 F.3 d 1235 (9 th Cir. 2013).
14 ManagedPharmacy Care, 716 E 3 d 1235, cert. denied, No. 13-253, 2014 WL o24z (U.S. Jan.
13, 204).

15 Peyton M. Sturges, Supreme Court Rejects Medi-Cal Petitions;Ninth CircuitLifts Rate Reduction Injunction, BLOOMBERGBNA (Jan. 13, 2014), available at http http://news.bna.com/hcln/
HCLNWB/splitdisplay.adp?fedfid= 39 9 47 264 -vname=hcpnotallissues&jd=aoea9dx2&split=o.
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rulemaking and formal adjudication that further transparency, accountability,
and participatory principles, all of which are viewed as central to achieving
administrative legitimacy and thus justifying judicial deference.
But a vast amount of agency action falls into the category of informal
adjudication, and the question of how much deference this kind of action
should receive is a more difficult one. The issue of deference for CMS approval
of state rate cuts is a perfect example. CMS approval is not subject to the APA
procedural requirements governing rulemaking or formal adjudication; nor are
there comparable procedural safeguards in the Medicaid Act. Indeed, like other
informal adjudicatory action, federal regulatory approval of state Medicaid rates
has historically lacked the legal and de facto indicia of formality, transparency,
and deliberation, which are characteristic of the kind of agency action that
typically gets deference. Unfortunately, the scholarly debate and jurisprudence
about deference for informal adjudication is not as developed or coherent as
for rulemaking and formal adjudication. This is, in part, because it is difficult
to generalize about the varied forms of agency action that fall within this vast
category of informal adjudication.
Nonetheless, a number of Supreme Court cases have limited or qualified
Chevron deference and provided important guidance for courts in determining
how much deference should be given to informal agency action. Existing
administrative law principles do provide a coherent framework for evaluating
informal adjudicatory action, making clear that courts need to take a hard
look at an agency's decision-making process before granting deference. And
the deference question in the Medicaid payment cases provides a timely
opportunity to explore this doctrine and highlight its importance generally.
This Article contrasts the different approaches taken by the district court and
Ninth Circuit in Managed Pharmacy Care, in order to show why deference
for informal adjudicatory action should not be presumed simply because an
agency acts pursuant to an official grant of authority. Rather, an approach
that scrutinizes the specific circumstances of the agency's action to determine
whether it satisfies the criteria justifying deference-like the district court's
analysis described in greater detail in 'Part III-is more faithful to deference
doctrine and does a better job of promoting administrative legitimacy.
Part I of this Article describes the procedural and substantive questions
initially presented to the Supreme Court in Independent Living Center. 'The
Court only granted certiorari on the procedural issue, but in its explanation
for why it was remanding the case, the Court's dicta speculating about how the
substantive question would be resolved appears to have significantly impacted
the outcome of these claims. Part I provides historical context for understanding
both issues, highlighting the federal regulatory neglect that has shaped the
procedural and substantive arguments in Medicaid payment disputes generally,
and in particular, the initial challenges in California that ultimately reached the
Supreme Court in Independent Living Center.
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Part II describes Independent Living Center and explores its dicta about
deference in greater detail. This Part also does what the Court in Independent
Living Center failed to do-situate its comments about the APA and Chevron
deference within the broader context of administrative law doctrine that has
further defined and limited the application of deference in ways particularly
relevant to the informal adjudicatory context. For example, the Supreme Court
in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.'6 and United States v. Mead Corp.'7 addressed the
issue of how much weight, if any, should be given to agency action that was
not subject to the procedural safeguards of rulemaking or formal adjudication
under the APA, identifying several factors courts should consider in making this
determination." They also treated deference as occurring along a spectrum, in
which the amount of deference due is based on the character and circumstances
of the agency action. And in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n of the United
States v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., the Court affirmed the
importance of judicial review to ensure reasoned decision-making as a check
on agency discretion."
Some have criticized deference doctrine as incoherent, but the Court's
jurisprudence has been animated by long-standing and widely shared concerns
about administrative legitimacy. Administrative action is viewed as legitimate
when an agency follows procedures to ensure meaningful participation by
those impacted by its action, engages in reasoned deliberation by officials based
on relevant expertise and data, is transparent about its reasons for action or
inaction, and applies the law consistently. These principles are reflected in the
factors identified by the Supreme Court as relevant for determining whether
deference is warranted.
Part III critiques the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Independent Living
Center dicta in Managed Pharmacy Care, in light of this more comprehensive
understanding of deference doctrine. On the one hand, there is a long history of
states' blatant disregard for federal law in the face of federal regulatory neglect,
and such neglect demands close judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, the Obama
administration has been far more active with respect to federal rate-setting
requirements, which would seem to suggest that some deference is warranted.
16
17

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).

18 Skidmore was decided in 1944, prior to passage of the APA, and it considered what weight
should be given by courts to the "rulings, interpretations, and opinions" of an Administrator that
did not have the power to make legal findings of fact or determine violations of law. 323 U.S. at
137-138. Skidmore announced several factors relevant to determining how much weight, if any, the
interpretations should receive. In 200, the Mead Court affirmed Skidmore. 533 U.S. at 221. Mead
held that a Customs ruling letter did not deserve Chevron deference because it was not issued
pursuant to the agency's power to engage in adjudication, notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by
some other indication of comparable congressional intent, but that it deserved some respect based
on the Skidmore factors.Id.
59 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
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But are these recent developments evidence of the kind of reasoned decisionmaking and exercise of agency expertise that justifies Chevron deference? The
Ninth Circuit's cursory explanation for deference to CMS approval does not
provide a satisfactory answer to this question because it fails to consider the
Mead/Skidmore factors relevant to assessing the legitimacy of administrative
action. This stands in stark contrast to the district court's more probing
deference analysis, which revealed how CMS's informal approval of Medi-Cal
rates failed to satisfy the Mead/Skidmore factors. The district court highlighted
CMS's inconsistent and unexplained interpretations of federal rate-setting
requirements, as well as instances of irrational or unsupported conclusions
about the data, which undermined claims of deference and illustrated why
courts should take a hard look at such action.
Part IV delves more deeply into the theory of administrative legitimacy
and judicial review animating the Ninth Circuit's deferential approach and
heavy reliance on Independent Living Center.The Ninth Circuit criticized the
district court for "delving into the minutiae" of Medicaid and second-guessing
CMS policy, instead of viewing the analysis as the kind of hard look review
that ensures reasoned decision-making. The Ninth Circuit clearly viewed the
district court as engaging in judicial overreach, but did not provide a coherent
explanation for why. Part IV considers three possible explanations for the
Ninth Circuit's approach in light of the tension between the court's role as
an external check on administrative legitimacy, and concerns about judicial
overreach and policy making. Ultimately, however, it concludes that the district
court's approach strikes the right balance. The result of the district court's
injunctions would not have been to make the final policy decision, but rather
to require greater explanation and more deliberation, which should, in turn,
promote agency legitimacy and result in better decision-making. This function
of judicial review is particularly important in programs like Medicaid that
delegate tremendous power to regulators to act without the kind of safeguards
that promote administrative legitimacy from within.

I.

MEDICAID PAYMENT CHALLENGES: WHAT EVERYONE THOUGHT
WAS AT STAKE IN INDEPENDErNTLIVING CENTER

Around the country, states struggle to balance their budgets, in part by
making deep cuts to health and other benefits programs for low-income
residents. One area that continues to be vulnerable is the Medicaid programthe joint federal-state public health insurance program that provides health
care for the very poor. The cuts have sparked policy debates between state
officials insisting that such cuts are necessary to get their fiscal houses in order
and patients' advocates who criticize states for trying to balance the budget on
the backs of our most vulnerable citizens.2 0

20

Clark, MedicaidAccess, supra note

12.
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One of the most common places we see Medicaid cuts is in rate setting
for physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers. There is already a
shortage of providers, and cuts threaten to drive even more providers out of
the Medicaid program, further jeopardizing access for Medicaid beneficiaries.
These payment cuts have sparked fierce legal battles in federal court. Patients
and health care providers around the country have brought suits challenging
these payment reductions on the ground that they violate health care access
and quality protections in federal law. 2 1 These suits raise important substantive
and procedural legal issues. The substantive question is whether state rate cuts
violate Medicaid rate-setting requirements. The procedural issue concerns
whether patients and providers have a right to challenge such violations in
court. The Supreme Court in Independent Living Center only granted certiorari
on the second question, but the Court's decision seems to have important
implications for the first one as well.
A. The Substantive Question:Determining Whether Rates Violate
MedicaidRate-SettingRequirements

Medicaid program administration, including rate setting, is delegated to
states, but subject to federal oversight. Although states are given a great deal of
discretion to choose rate-setting methodology and set provider reimbursement
rates, the Medicaid Act establishes certain constraints on this discretion.22 A key
provision of the Act, commonly referred to as "§ 30(A)," requires that Medicaid
payments be "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care, and ...
sufficient to enlist enoughproviders so that care and services are available under

the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the
general population in the geographic area." 23 The first two factors-economy and
efficiency-are typically understood to reflect federal concerns about payments
being too high. The second two factors-quality and sufficiency of providers
(also commonly referred to as the Equal Access Provision)-are understood
to reflect concerns about payments being too low. Section 30(A), especially the
Equal Access Provision, is the primary basis for lawsuits challenging payment
cuts.2 4
21 Id. at 805-28.

22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3o)(A) (2012).
23 Id. (emphasis added).
24 See SARA ROSENBAUM, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., MEDICAID PAYMENT RATE LAWSUITS: EvoLVING COURT VIEWS MEAN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR MEDI-CAL 8-II (2oo9), http://

www.chcf.org/-/media/MEDIA%2oLIBRARY%2oFiles/PDF/M/PDF%2oMediCalProviderRateLitigation.pdf (discussing the evolution of payment suits and the shift in legal theories after
the demise of private challenges under Section 1983). Other provisions in the Medicaid Act have
been used to challenge rate cuts with varying success. For example, the Boren Amendment, 42
U.S.C.

§ 1396a(a)(r3)(A)

(1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C.

§ 139 6a(i 3 )(A)

(2012)), which required

rates for hospitals and nursing facilities to be "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which
must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities,"was an effective tool for chal-

218

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[ Vol.1o2

Apart from these factors, the Act does not give much guidance about what
the state rate-setting process requires; it simply requires a state to submit a
state plan amendment (SPA) to the federal regulatory agency charged with
oversight, CMS, when it wants to propose a change in rates or rate-setting
methodology. The Medicaid Act requires states to make assurances of § 30(A)
compliance in the SPA, but the statute does not explicitly require states to make
findings to this effect. 25 The regulations governing payments for in-patient
hospital services and long-term care facility services provide more guidance in
that they explicitly require states to find that rates "are reasonable and adequate
to meet the costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities," but this does not apply to payments for other Medicaid services. 26
Medicaid regulations also require states to submit the new payment rates by
provider type, to note whether the change reflects an increase or decrease in
rates, and to make projections about the short-term and long-term effects of
the new rates on the availability of services. 27 But neither the statute nor the
regulations explicitly require a state to submit its findings or the underlying
data it used to set rates and determine § 30(A) compliance to CMS; nor do
they require CMS to review these findings or data. 28 In fact, the law provides
for default SPA approval if CMS fails to act within a certain time, which
has not been uncommon.2 1 CMS has authority to promulgate regulations to
establish clearer guidance about what § 30(A) requires states to do as part of
the rate-setting process, such as the kind of data states must consider, but it has
not provided such guidance for proposed rate cuts.3 0 It has only provided more

lenging rates prior to its repeal in 1997. See Clark, MedicaidAccess, supra note 12, at 796-805. The

Medicaid Act also requires states to ensure that Medicaid services are widely available, that beneficiaries have timely access to care, and that the program is administered with respect to what is in
the best interest of program recipients. Id. at 794. These requirements have been used successfully
to challenge rates for dental care in California. See, e.g., Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572,575-80 (E.D.
Cal. 1990).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3o)(A) (20x2) requires a State Plan to "assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so
that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services
are available to the general population in the geographic area." See also Clark,MedicaidAccess,supra
note 12, at 798-801 (comparing § 3 o(A) with the Boren Amendment, which was subsequently repealed, to highlight the absence of an explicit "findings" requirement in § 3o(A)).
26 42 C.F.R. § 447.250(a) (202); see also 42 C.F.R. § 44 7 -253 (b) (2012) (providing that states
must make these findings "[w]henever the Medicaid agency makes a change in its methods and
standards, but not less often than annually").
27

42 C.F.R.

§ 447-255

(202).

See Clark,MedicaidAccess, supra note 12, at 829-30; see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496
U.S. 498, 522 (1990) (noting the Secretary's limited oversight of Medicaid rate-setting); Rand E.
Rosenblatt, 7he Courts,Health Care Reform, and the ReconstructionofAmerican Social Legislation,18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 4 39 (993) (describing the problem of under-enforcement in health care).
29 See 42 C.F.R. § 430.16 (2012) (providing default approval in 90 days if there is no federal
action disapproving the plan).
30 The Department of Health and Human Services finally proposed such regulatory guid28
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specific procedural requirements in the case of rate increases."
In the midst of this regulatory void, federal courts have been primarily
responsible for defining and enforcing § 30(A) obligations. A comprehensive
review of Medicaid payment suits since the 1970s shows that most circuits
consider rate cuts that are proposed solely in response to a state's budgetary
needs and without any consideration of § 30(A) requirements to be clearly
illegal, and courts have typically invalidated such cuts.32 Nonetheless, it is
common for states to cut rates in this manner, and this is what California did
in its initial attempts to cut Medi-Cal rates in the Independent Living Center
case. 3 Federal courts have had to intervene because, even in these egregious
cases, federal regulators typically fail to deny the SPA or to even investigate the
state's § 30(A) assurances.3 4
The harder cases are where cuts are not so blatantly illegal-that is, where
states have undertaken some kind of review prior to setting rates. In these cases,
there has been greater variation in the level of scrutiny applied by courts to
ensure § 30(A) compliance. 3s Courts have found this task more challenging
because of the statutory ambiguity concerning the rate-setting process and the
amount of discretion given to states and federal regulators in the Medicaid
Act. The Act makes clear that rate setting requires balancing multiple goals
and considerations, and the Medicaid program encourages state flexibility and
experimentation in deciding how best to achieve those goals. Prior to its recent
decision in Managed Pharmacy Care, the Ninth Circuit had been the most
active Circuit in protecting providers' and beneficiaries' § 30(A) rights against
states. It was the only Circuit willing to read specific procedural requirements
into § 30(A), interpreting it as requiring states to set rates based on current
provider cost studies."6 And it was willing to closely review a state's rate-setting
process for defects that would undermine the state's conclusions about § 30(A)
compliance.37

ance in zo1, but the proposed rule generated many comments and concerns, and the regulations
have not yet been finalized. See Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76
Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,347-48 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.ER. Pt. 447)31

Id.

32

See Clark, MedicaidAccess,supra note 12, at 805-ii.

33 See Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F 3d 644,

655-56

( 9 th Cir. 2009) ("In this case, the record supports the district court's conclusion that'the only rea-

son for imposing the cuts was California's current fiscal emergency.'.... .hus,... the State's decision
to reduce Medi-Cal reimbursement rates based solely on state budgetary concerns violated federal
law."), vacatedsub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204

(20z2).
34 Clark, MedicaidAccess,supra note 12, at 8oS-i.
Id. at 829-30.
36 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F 3 d 1491, 1500 ( 9 th Cir. 1997) (holding that states could

35

not make good faith and rational assurances of § 3 0(A) compliance without a study of provider
costs). For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
37 Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572, 575-80 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that Medicaid payment
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Although other federal courts have enjoined state cuts for violating the
Medicaid Act, most have not been as active in their scrutiny of states' ratesetting processes. Some courts have been willing to provide some level of review
to ensure § 30(A) compliance, but ultimately were very deferential to states.3 1
Other courts have been hesitant to second-guess a state's rate-setting process,
but have left the door open for plaintiffs to prove that the rates were so low that
they would adversely impact access and quality in ways that violated § 30(A)
guarantees.3 ' And at least one court held that the lack of clear requirements in
§ 30(A) essentially rendered it unenforceable in the courts.4
It is not clear why the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the
substantive issue of § 30(A) compliance, which would have given the Court the
opportunity to address this variation among lower courts. It could be because
CMS urged against it, as it was in the process of studying the issue and beginning
the rulemaking process, which would finally give the states and courts longneeded guidance. It could also be that there was no compelling reason to do
so because the rate cuts that were originally challenged in IndependentLiving
Centerwere the kind of egregious violation of federal law that presented an easy
case for almost all federal courts. Although the Supreme Court chose not to
take up this substantive issue, it indirectly returned to it when it reframed the
procedural question presented to the Ninth Circuit on remand.
B. The ProceduralQuestion: Whether Plaintiffs Can Use the Supremacy Clause
to Challenge Medicaid Cuts in FederalCourt

States have long complained about Medicaid payment suits, claiming that
they interfere with states' difficult job of managing their own budgets and
undermine the discretion they have been delegated under the Medicaid Act.
States' first line of defense has been to attack plaintiffs' right to bring these
suits in the first place. As noted in the Introduction, the Independent Living
Center plaintiffs, like plaintiffs in other states, successfully used the Supremacy
Clause to get the cuts preliminarily enjoined by the district court and affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit. In the appeal to the Supreme Court, California officials
challenged whether Medicaid providers and beneficiaries could bring a private
right of action under the Supremacy Clause to challenge state rate cuts as
inconsistent with-and thus preempted by--§ 30(A). 4 1

rates for dental services (Denti-Cal) were inadequate to ensure equal access under § 3 o(A) and
violated a number of other access related requirements).
38 Clark, MedicaidAccess, supra note 12, at 805-811.
39 Id
40 Id.

41 Douglas v.Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, i2o7-o8

(2012).
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By granting certiorari on this procedural question, the Supreme Court

renewed a recurring dispute about the right of private individuals to enforce
Medicaid spending conditions on the rate-setting process. 42 Because the
Medicaid Act does not create an express private action for this, providers and
beneficiaries have had to use other legal tools to bring these challenges in
federal court. Beginning in the 1970s, patients and providers used a federal
civil rights statute, known as § 1983, to enforce various Medicaid rate-setting
requirements.13 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for "the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of
the United States." States'initial attacks on plaintiffs'rights to bring these suits
were unsuccessful in lower courts, and in 1990 the Supreme Court in Wilder
v. Virginia HospitalAss'n45 affirmed this implied right of action. Wilder insisted
that such suits were a critical enforcement tool for providers and beneficiaries
because of the lack of federal regulatory oversight which allowed states to ignore
federal law." Even Congress has affirmed the importance of this private right
of action at various times-through explicit legislative action and statements,
as well as by its failure to amend the Medicaid Act to prevent such suits. 47
This affirmation occurred despite concerns expressed by some legislators that
such suits made it difficult for states to cut costs and effectively administer
their Medicaid programs. 48 Nonetheless, twelve years after Wilder, the Supreme
Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe revisited § 1983 and severely narrowed its
scope. 49 Although Gonzaga did not involve a private challenge to Medicaid
rates,s0 almost every federal court that considered how Gonzaga applied to such
challenges held that § 1983 could no longer be used.

42 See ROSENBAUM, supra note 24, at 8-II.

43 Clark, MedicaidAccess,supra note 12, at 802-o5.
44 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (2012).

45 Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,525-28 (1990) (affirming that § 1983 could be used
by private plaintiffs to challenge state Medicaid rates that violate federal law; in this case the rates
violated the Boren Amendment, a provision similar to § 3o(A)).
46 Id. at 507-08,516-19.
47 See id. at 521-22; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1122, at 4 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5649-51; 121 CONG. REc. 42,259 (1975) (statement of Sen. Robert Taft Jr.) (illustrating that
Congress has not always acted consistently, and it has taken actions that seemed to weaken some
limits on state discretion, such as repealing the explicit "findings" requirements for state rate setting for hospital and skilled nursing services in the Boren Amendment). Despite some legislators'
concerns about how such provisions have been used to halt or slow state rate cuts, there has never
been enough support to repeal § 3 o(A), which applies broadly to the rate-setting process for all
Medicaid services. For further discussion, see Clark, MedicaidAccess,supra note 12, at 8o2-o5.
48 Clark, MedicaidAccess,supra note 12,at 8o2.
49 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).

50 Id. at 276. Gonzaga involved an alleged violation of the Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974.
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In response to losing § 1983 as a vehicle for Medicaid payment challenges,
plaintiffs offered a new legal theory for their private cause of action: the
Supremacy Clause." The Supremacy Clause provides that where federal and
state law conflict, federal law trumpS. 52 In the Medicaid payment cases, plaintiffs
alleged that state cuts that violated § 30(A) must be invalidated because they
conflict with the goals and express requirements of federal law.53
States, on the other hand, have argued that the Supremacy Clause is not
a legitimate tool for enforcing Medicaid rate-setting requirements. They have
emphasized that the Supremacy Clause has been used to defend against state
law or action that would requirea person to do something that conflicted with or
violated federal law, and they have tried to distinguish this from the way providers
and beneficiaries have used it in payment challenges. According to states, the
Supremacy Clause should not be a vehicle for affirmatively challenging a state's
reimbursement rates because providers voluntarily participate in the Medicaid
program.54 In addition, they have said that allowing such suits would create an
end-run around Gonzaga and upset the regulatory structure contemplated in
the Medicaid Act, which expressly delegates authority to approve or deny state
SPAs to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Thus, states
argue that enforcement of rate-setting program requirements should be vested
solely in CMS, the division of HHS tasked with SPA oversight."
The states'arguments have been largely unsuccessful in the lower courts, and
for years, providers and beneficiaries have been using the Supremacy Clause."
This is one reason many believed that the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
foreshadowed the elimination of this avenue for judicial review; the other
reason was speculation that the conservative majority would jump at the chance
to remove battles over state health care financing decisions from the federal
courts, continuing a trend that had limited private plaintiffs' access to federal
court." Thus, IndependentLiving Centerreceived a great deal of attention, and a

51 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . ..
52 Id.
53 See ROSENBAUM, supra note 24, at I, 9-11.
54 See Brief for Nat'l Governors Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Douglas
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. o9-958, 09-1'58,
10-283), 2011 WL 2132704,

at *22-23.

55 See id. at *27-28.
56 See, e.g., Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644,
652-54 (9 th Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).The Court's failure to grant certiorari on the substantive question likely exacerbated this fear because the elimination of plaintiffs'right to challenge cuts in federal court would
have made the substantive question of § 3 o(A) compliance effectively moot.
57 Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 1213-1214 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting, joined by Scalia,Thomas, & Alito, JJ.) (criticizing the majority for not deciding the question presented and stating that
the Supremacy Clause should not be used to challenge state rate cuts regardless of CMS approval).
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number of amicus briefs were filed. Predictably, patient advocates and provider
organizations weighed in on the side of the plaintiffs,5 while states supported
California.5 ' Less predictable, however, was the divergence in positions taken by
former regulatory officials and the Obama administration.
The federal government sided with California, with the acting Solicitor
General filing an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to hold that Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries do not have a legal right to sue in federal court to
prevent illegal state cuts. 60 The Obama administration argued that it should be
up to CMS to determine and enforce § 30(A) compliance. 1 In asserting its
position, the Obama administration did not rely on any firm legal precedent.
Rather, the crux of its position was that state violations of Medicaid program
requirements are different from the kind of other conflicts with federal law that
the Supremacy Clause has been used to prevent. Most of the government's brief
was devoted to justifying this difference."2
The brief highlighted the fact that Medicaid is a cooperative program and
argued that program requirements like the Equal Access Provision look more
like contract conditions between the federal government and states than the
kind of clear and specific statutory right that is enforceable by beneficiaries and
providers. 63 Second, the Obama administration argued that CMS enforcement
would create better and fairer results because it has the requisite expertise that
courts do not have, especially given the complexity of the Medicaid statute
and the multiple and potentially conflicting goals of access, quality, economy,
and efficiency that states must balance.M Finally, the government claimed that
allowing federal courts to determine these issues was unfair because of the
inconsistency that results from different circuits'interpretations of federal law.6 s
The essence of CMS's argument was that it was better equipped for the job
than courts.

58 See, e.g., Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. Of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-158, 10-283);
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
and Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos.
09-958,09-1158,

10-283).

59 See Brief for Nat'l Governors Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Douglas
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, o9-z58,
1o-283).
60 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Douglas v. Indep.
Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283), zon
WL 2132705, at *II-32.

61 Id.
6 2 Id.
63 Id. at *9-1, *16-18, *2I-3.

64 Id. at *11,*31-32.

65 Id. at *32.
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But the briefs by former U.S. Health and Human Services officials and
members of Congress presented a far different picture of CMS-not as an
effective regulator of Medicaid access protections, but as an understaffed and
ineffective agency that has lacked the political will and capability to provide
meaningful review of rate cuts.66 This picture is consistent with the regulatory
void I have described elsewhere: the agency's failure to define and enforce federal
access protections; regulators' uneven focus on SPAs that would potentially
increase rates, but not on those proposing cuts; and an utter lack of any
judgment or expertise in agency determinations about whether SPAs comply
with § 30(A).67 While there has been some variation in judicial oversight of
this issue, any inconsistency has been due primarily to CMS's failure to issue
regulatory guidance for states and the courts.
In sum, in both the procedural question taken up by the Court and the
substantive question lurking in the background, CMS's regulatory role has
been critical to both sides' arguments. Essentially, CMS and the states argued
that courts should trust CMS to enforce the law. But the plaintiffs, health care
advocates, and former regulators pointed to past regulatory failures to show
that such trust was not warranted and to highlight the importance of robust
judicial review. The federal regulatory oversight of rate setting contemplated by
the Act has simply not been reflected in CMS's action on the ground, at least
not until recently.

II.

INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTER'S (IN)DECISION DUE TO
"CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES"

As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court never answered the
question on which it granted certiorari-whether patients and providers could
challenge Medicaid rate cuts in federal court using the Supremacy Clause. By
refusing to answer the question, Independent Living Center effectively preserved
plaintiffs' right to do this, at least where there has been no federal approval of
the cuts. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reframed the question and remanded it
back to the Ninth Circuit due to "changed circumstances"-namely, that CMS
approved the proposed rates as consistent with federal law while litigation was
pending. 68

66 Brief for Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Douglas, 132 S.
Ct. 1204 (Nos. o9-958, 09-1158, 10-283), 2on WL 3706105, at *4-5; see Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (Nos. og-958,
09-1z58, 1s-o),2011 WL 3467244, at *21.

67 Clark, MedicaidAccess, supra note 12, at 829-32 (describing the federal regulatory void that
has existed for years in the case of SPA approvals when rate cuts have been proposed).
68 Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at i2o7-o8.
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Notably, the process by which CMS approved these rates did not look like
the kind of rubber stamping or regulatory inaction described in Part I,which has
made judicial intervention so compelling in § 30(A) challenges. Rather, CMS
seems to have played an active regulatory role: it inquired about the findings
upon which California based its § 30(A) assurances; it refused to approve the
rates initially due to access concerns; it required state officials to produce more
information; and there appeared to be a good deal of interaction between state
and federal regulatory officials concerning access.6 1 Indeed, CMS's actions in
this case seemed to reflect a commitment by the Obama administration to
greater regulatory oversight of Medicaid access generally."
The Court's decision to remand the case in light of CMS's approval of
the cuts makes clear that CMS's regulatory role is relevant to the question on
remand, but the Court's brief explanation raises more questions than it provides
answers about what this impact will be. In dicta, the Court suggests that federal
agency action might impact judicial review procedurally, by creating a preferred
avenue for seeking review in the courts, and substantively, by requiring courts
to apply a greater level of deference. The Court's dicta fails to go beyond mere
speculation, however, because these issues were not briefed.
This Part explores the Independent Living Center Court's sparse reasoning
about why agency action should matter in theory and highlights what is missing
from the opinion that would be necessary to determine whether deference
should apply to CMS approval of SPAs specifically. This Part also provides
greater context for the Court's administrative law jurisprudence on deferencecontext that is particularly important for evaluating the level of deference due
to informal adjudicatory actions like SPA approvals. Parts III and IV will use
this more developed theory of deference to critique the Ninth Circuit's recent
application of Independent Living Center in Managed Pharmacy Care and to

consider the troubling implications for informal adjudicatory action more
generally.

69 Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F 3 d I235,

1242-1243

(9 th Cir. 2013).

70 Since 2008, CMS has performed more searching inquiries into § 30(A) assurances before
approving requests for rate cuts. See Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services,
76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,348 (May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447) (describing the administrations recent oversight activities). And in 20z, CMS proposed regulatory guidance for §
proposed rule makes clear that states can no
3 o(A) compliance. Id.Although not yet finalized, the
longer ignore § 3o(A) requirements and suggests a framework for states' § 3 o(A) access reviews. Id.
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A. Independent Living Center Dicta:
Why FederalAgencyAction Might Matter
The new question presented by a majority of the Court was whether federal
approval of the cuts "may require respondents now to proceed by seeking review
of the agency determination under the [APA] rather than in an action against
California under the Supremacy Clause."" The majority explained why it
thought CMS approval had changed the posture of the case:
For one thing, the APA would likely permit respondents to obtain an
authoritative judicial determination of the merits of their legal claim. The
[APA] provides for judicial review of final agency action. It permits any
person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action to obtain judicial
review of the lawfulness of that action. And it requires a reviewing court
capricious, an abuse of
to set aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, 72
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

There is nothing radical or controversial about the Court's observations.
The first part focuses on the fact that agency action may make the Supremacy
Clause unnecessary because the APA expressly provides for judicial review of
federal agency action. Recall that many plaintiffs historically have challenged
cuts that states were attempting to implement prior to, or in the absence of,
federal regulatory action. The Supremacy Clause was necessary to protect
plaintiffs against state violations occurring in this federal regulatory void. The
last sentence simply highlights the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to
agency action and mentioned in the APA. In fact, this statement about of the
relevance of the APA in defining the availability and scope ofjudicial review of
federal action is consistent with how lower courts had previously treated suits
challenging federally-approved SPAs under the APA.
The troubling part of the opinion comes in the Court's speculation about
the potential problems that could result if plaintiffs were left with a choice
between the Supremacy Clause or the APA. One problem is that the Court's
concern is based on speculation about how the APA standard would be applied
in these cases, and that this standard would be more deferential than the
standard used by federal courts in Supremacy Clause challenges. The Court
began by noting that although CMS approval "does not change the underlying

71 Indep. Living Cr., 132 S. Ct. at a21o (citation omitted).
72 Id (citations omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7 o6(2)(A) (2o2)).
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substantive question" about whether California's cuts comply with federal law,
"it may change the answer." It then went on to explain why it thought this
was so:
[R]espondents' basic challenge now presents the kind of legal question
that ordinarily calls for APA review. The Medicaid Act commits to the
federal agency the power to administer a federal program. And here the
agency has acted under this grant of authority. That decision carries weight.
After all, the agency is comparatively expert in the statute's subject matter.
And the language of the particular provision at issue here is broad and
general, sug esting that the agency's expertise is relevant in determining its
application.

The Court's concern only makes sense if lower courts apply different
standards of review to payment challenges under a Supremacy Clause and
APA analysis. And as evidence of this possibility, the Court noted that the
Ninth Circuit initially "declined to give weight to the Federal Government's
interpretation" of § 30(A) in determining whether the rate cut violated
federal law, but that "ordinarily review of agency action requires courts to
apply certain standards of deference to agency decision making" under the
APA. 74 In describing this standard, the Court cited to Chevron, which has
been characterized by some as effecting a revolution that demanded greater
deference by courts to agency action. 7s The Court also relied on National
Cable & TelecommunicationsAss'n v. BrandXInternetServices7 6 (BrandX), which

held that courts should defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes,
even when they conflict with that court's own prior judicial interpretations.
The question of how much deference, if any, should be given to CMS's
interpretations and determination of § 30(A) compliance in SPA approvals
is considered in greater detail in Parts III and IV. The important point for
now is that this issue was not briefed. Because the issue was not briefed, the
Court's speculation about whether courts would apply different standards for
an APA versus Supremacy Clause claim was wrong, at least based on prior
cases. Moreover, the Court did not consider key Supreme Court cases, which
have limited or complicated the question of deference, especially in informal
adjudicatory action. Finally, the majority's speculation that CMS approvals
73 Id

74 Id. The Ninth Circuit had long interpreted § 30(A) to require states to perform provider
cost studies before setting rates, and the state's failure to do this was one reason the Ninth Circuit
had affirmed the district court's injunctions prior to Douglas. During the litigation, CMS offered a
different interpretation of § 3o(A), as not requiring cost studies. However, this interpretation was
not the result of rulemaking or formal adjudication, and was inconsistent with CMS's prior interpretation. See discussion infra Part III.
75 See William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, 7he Continuum ofDeference: Supreme Court
Treatment ofAgency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. io83, ro85-87

(20o8); Thomas W Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833-35
(2001).

76 Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 120; see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
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would satisfy the requirements for Chevron deference was not based on any
inquiry into the specific facts or circumstances surrounding CMS action in
this case.n Consequently, the Court's dicta about whether Chevron deference
should apply should not be viewed as controlling without a more fact-specific
inquiry into the circumstances and context of that action. In fact, the Court
acknowledged as much when it qualified its own speculation by noting that
there may be reasons why a court should not apply these ordinary standards of
deference."
Nonetheless, California and federal officials have seized on the Court's
dicta about Chevron deference for SPA approvals in asserting that Independent
Living Center was a win for states and viewing it as a message to lower courts
to defer to CMS."9 And even more concerning is that the Ninth Circuit seems
to have adopted this view. But this ignores the explicit disclaimers made by the
Court, and more importantly, fails to consider the deference question within
the textured deference doctrine that has developed through other seminal
administrative law cases, like Skidmore,Mead,and State Farm.Indeed, what some
perceive to be a simple yes or no question about whether Chevron deference
should apply actually requires a more nuanced analysis of the principles and
limits of APA deference, its application to informal agency adjudication, and
the proper role of courts in mediating disputes arising out of programs that are
complex, interstitial, and more evolutionary than static. Determining deference
in such cases requires more work by courts to be sure; but the next section
explains why this is necessary for ensuring administrative legitimacy.
B. Administrative Legitimacy andjudicialReview
Judicial review is central to ensuring the legitimacy of the administrative
state.' Administrative agencies, especially in the modern administrative state,
have been delegated a great deal of power to create and enforce regulation that
touches almost every aspect of our lives. In this modern state, Congress enacts
legislation that leaves a number of policy-making gaps to be filled by agencies
through their rulemaking and adjudicatory functions. There has been great
concern about Congress delegating so much power to define law to a body
77 Id.

78 Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 12xo.
79 See Clark, The (In)decision ofDouglas v.ILC, supra note 7 (citing commentary about states'
interpretation of Douglas).The federal government has also cited Douglas for the proposition that
CMS approval of California cuts should get Chevron deference. See, e.g., Brief for Federal Appellant at 18, 24-25, Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3 d 1235 (9 th Cir. 203) (Nos. 12-55315 &
12-55335),

2012

WL Hx34209, at *18, *24-25.

80 See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxiesfor JudicialReview:
Building Legitimacyfrom the Inside-Out,37 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013), availableat
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127838("Judicial review is considered an indispensible [sic] legitimizer of
the administrative state.... [It is a hallmark feature of the [APA] [and] the various standards of review reinforce democratic norms, promote accountability, and act as a check against arbitrariness.").
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that is not accountable to the public in the way that legislators are, as well
as concern about vesting so much power to adjudicate and resolve disputes
outside of the traditional protections of Article III courts." Much of the focus
in administrative law scholarship has been on how judicial review furthers
administrative legitimacy by ensuring that agencies act according to statutory
commands, and that their discretion is exercised in a deliberate, consistent, and
fair manner.
The APA addresses these concerns in a couple of ways. It creates procedural
requirements for agency rulemaking and formal adjudications, 8 2 which enhance
administrative legitimacy from within." Public notice and the opportunity for
comment, documentation of agency findings, and hearing procedures ensure
public participation and transparency of agency reasons for action, which,
in turn, promote accountability and fairness. Such requirements produce a
more deliberative process and thorough vetting of agency decisions, which
arguably promotes better policy making. Finally, these requirements facilitate
the production of information that enables meaningful judicial review of
challenged actions.
The APA also expressly provides for judicial review of agency action and
notes the bases on which agency action must be set aside.8 4 Specifically, the APA
requires agency action to be set aside if it violates statutory or constitutional
commands, or if the action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise inconsistent with the law." Unless statutorily exempted from review,
this standard of review applies to all kinds of agency action, including the vast
array of actions that fall within the informal adjudication category and are not
subject to the APA procedural requirements described above. Judicial review
serves as an external check on agency legitimacy: in the case of rulemaking
and formal adjudication, it helps to ensure that agencies comply with the APA
procedures that enhance agency decision-making; and in all cases, judicial
review helps guard against abuse of power and arbitrariness.
The idea of deference to agencies can only be understood properly with
reference to this fundamental concern about the misuse of agency discretion.
Courts have interpreted the APA as requiring deference to administrative
agencies under certain conditions: given their expertise and accountability to
the executive, agencies are in a better position than courts to fill in legislative

81 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, 7he PlaceofAgencies in Government: Separation ofPowers and the
FourthBranch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,574 (1984).

82 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (procedures governing notice and comment rulemaking);
§§ 553(c), 554, 556-557 (listing procedural requirements for formal rulemaking and adjudication).
83 Hammond & Markell, supra note 8o, at 316, 3I9-20; Sidney Shapiro et al., 7he Enlightenment ofAdministrative Law: Looking Inside the Agencyfor Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 463,
465-66 (2012).
84 5 US.C.

§§

701-702,704,706 (2012).

85 Id. § 7 o6(2)(A)-(C).
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gaps that involve value judgments and the balancing of policy goals." Lower
courts should not use judicial review to substitute their own policy judgments
for that of an agency's; judicial overreach is problematic because it undermines
the principles of accountability and administrative expertise that justify
congressional delegation to the agency in the first place." On the other
hand, the APA makes clear that when an agency fails to act consistently with
statutory goals or in a reasoned way, this deference will be lost." Defining the
line between improper judicial overreach and proper judicial check on agency
abuse is particularly challenging when statutory commands are vague, the
action involved requires legal and policy determinations, and the decisionmaking process is not subject to the kinds of internal procedures described
above as enhancing agency legitimacy.
The Supreme Court's administrative law doctrine should be understood as
providing guidance to lower courts faced with this challenge." The Court has
established two important principles that limit Chevron deference and should
guide courts' interpretation of Independent Living Center dicta in the case of
SPA approvals. One is the reasoned decision-making requirement. The other
is the view of deference as occurring along a spectrum, where the weight given
depends on the character and circumstances of the challenged agency action.
1. ReasonedDecision-Making.-Inreviewing agency action, courts demand that

agencies provide a reasonable basis for their decisions-that is, the agency must
demonstrate that it has considered relevant factors and can articulate a rational
connection between the evidence considered and its conclusion. This kind of
review came to be known as "hard look" review in the 19 7 0s and 1980s, and
it was developed by the Supreme Court to address concerns about agencies'
increasing use of informal actions to make legal and policy decisions with
significant implications.90 For example, in 1971 in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park,Inc. v. Volpe, the Court applied hard look review to an informal agency
decision to authorize federal funds for construction of a highway through a

86 See Strauss, supranote 81, at 578-79,581,597, 665.
87 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of theJudiciaryin Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239,1242 (1989).
88 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (noting the circumstances under which a reviewing court must set
agency action aside).
89 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Proceduresas Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUm. L.
REv. I749, 1749, 1753 (2007) (using legal scholarship and political theory to offer an account of seminal administrative law cases as interested in producing acceptable rules for agency decision-making
to enhance administrative legitimacy).
9o See, William S. Jordan III, Ossifcation Revisited- Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
SignifcantlyInterfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?,
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393,397,439 (2000); see also STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLIcY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 386-427 ( 7 th ed. 20H) (providing a more
detailed overview of the evolution of hard look review).
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public park.91 Although the governing statutes did not require the Secretary
of the Department of Transportation to make formal findings justifying the
decision, the Court remanded the case to the District Court for a closer review
of the Secretary's decisions.9 'Ihe Court explained that a more searching inquiry
into the Secretary's reasons was necessary in order to determine whether the
Secretary's decision was consistent with the law."
This hard look review was applied to agency rulemaking a decade later in
State Farm. In State Farm, the Court explained, and arguably expanded, the
kind of inquiry courts should make:9 4
[T]he scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is
narrow an a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made."In reviewing that explanation,
we must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment."
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.s

The reasoned decision-making requirement enables a court to determine
whether the criteria for deference have been met by focusing on how an agency
made its decision and whether it can justify its decision, not whether it made
the right one.
The fact that an act requires some agency discretion cannot be used as a
shield from judicial review. In cases where discretion could be used to disguise
arbitrariness or abuse, it is even more important for courts to take a hard look at
an agency's decision-making process to ensure that it is not arbitrary, capricious,
96
and then
or otherwise inconsistent with the law. For example, in State Farm,'
9
later in Massachusettsv. EPA, ' the Court found an agency's rescission of a rule
and its failure to promulgate a rule, respectively, to be arbitrary and capricious,
despite the inherently discretionary character of the decisions. In each case, the
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (197).
Id. at 415 (noting that although the Secretary's decision is not subject to APA rulemaking
or formal adjudication requirements, the court must engage in a "substantial inquiry" and a "thorough, probing, in-depth review" of the record of agency action).
93 Id. at 4o9-416 (holding that the statute clearly limited the Secretary's authority to authorize such funding, and that on remand the Secretary would need to show that there was no feasible
or prudent alternative to the use of such land and that the plan made provisions for minimizing
harm to the park).
91

92

94 See Jordan,supra note 90, at 398-340.

95 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
(1983) (citations omitted).
96 Id. at 30- 3 1.
97 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,527-35 (2007).

29,

43
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agency exercised its discretion in ways that seemed at odds with the statute's
goals, and it failed to produce findings or offer expertise that justified its choice."
'The result of hard look review is not to substitute the Court's own judgment
for the agency's in terms of the ultimate policy decision; rather, when agency
action is invalidated in such cases, it means that the agency must gather more
meaningful and relevant data to justify its conclusions, do a better job of vetting
and explaining its reasons for the action it has taken, or both." This focus on
reasoned decision-making enhances administrative legitimacy by "reinforc[ing]
administrative law values of participation, deliberation, and transparency, which
guard against arbitrariness and foster accountability."1oo And while some legal
scholars have criticized courts' application of this requirement as slowing or
impeding administrative progress, others have argued that this has enhanced
the quality of agency decision-making.'o'
98 See State Farm,463 U.S. at 48 ("Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by
the agency, the mandate of the Safety Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the logical
response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the installation of airbags. At the
very least this alternative way of achieving the objectives of the Act should have been addressed
and adequate reasons given for its abandonment."); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532-33 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("While the statute does condition the exercise
of EPA's authority on its formation of a 'judgment,' that judgment must relate to whether an air
pollutant . . . may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Put another way,
the use ofthe word'judgment'is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction
to exercise discretion within defined statutory limits.").
99 See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 90, at 396, 439 (arguing that a hard look review does not impede agency rulemaking and noting, based on one study, that agencies whose rules were initially
invalidated as arbitrary and capricious were able to successfiully implement the same policy about
80 percent of the time).
100 Hammond & Markell, supra note 8o, at 316 ("[T]hese principles are consistent with
the literature on procedural justice, which evaluates the legitimacy of decision-making procedures
based on norms of voice, respect, neutrality, and trust. Overall, these principles legitimize by affirming citizenship, reinforcing fidelity to statute, and furthering democratic norms.") (citations
omitted). A reasoned decision-making requirement is also consistent with theories of administrative legitimacy that depend on a civic republican view agency action. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld,A
Syncopated Chevron:Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmakingin Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof
Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV. 83, 127-30 (1994) (arguing for a political model of agency decision-making
that views agencies as a means of fostering public deliberation about government policy choices
and suggesting that courts should scrutinize the reasonableness of agencies' statutory interpretation more carefully); Shapiro et al., supra note 83, at 484-85 (arguing that in the case of rulemaking,
the role of judicial review is to turn it into more of a civic republican process). At the time this
was written, Chevron was understood as a significant shift in how courts would defer to agency
interpretations, but this was before Chevron was qualified by Mead, especially regarding informal
agency actions.
101 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, andJudicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490 (2002) (discussing these objections and offering
a modest defense of judicial review). Seidenfeld asserts that "the psychology of individual decisionmaking biases and group decisionmaking dynamics suggests that judicial review does improve
the overall quality of rules." Id. He qualifies this, however, by noting that his article only addresses
arbitrary and capricious review of agency legislative rules and not judicial review of issues of law,
such as interpretations of statutes. Id.
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2. InformalAdjudication.-Thescholarly literature on the role ofjudicial review
as a check on administrative legitimacy has primarily focused on rulemaking
and formal adjudication. In these instances,judicial review and APA procedural
requirements work nicely together to enhance administrative legitimacy by
ensuring that specific APA procedures are followed and applied in an unbiased,
transparent, and meaningful way. Agency action that falls into the broader
category of informal adjudication, however, is largely unregulated by the
APA."2 From a doctrinal standpoint it is more difficult to generalize about how
such action should be treated because of the wide variety of action that falls into
this category and the vast discretion left to agencies with respect to how they
make decisions.'o3 Nonetheless, the Court's current deference doctrine provides
guiding principles.
Although Chevron is widely cited for the proposition that agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes should get deference,'0 the Court in
Mead made clear that not all agency interpretations are equal in this regard.
Mead identified particular indicia or characteristics of agency action that are

102 Sees U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7) (2012) (defining "order"to mean "the whole or a part ofa final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter
other than rule making but including licensing") (defining "adjudication" as an "agency process for
the formulation of an order"); see also Edward Rubin, It s Time To Make the AdministrativeProcedure
ActAdministrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 124-126 (2003) (footnote omitted) ("Considering some
of the administrative actions that are neither rulemaking nor formal adjudication illustrates the
problem. One of the most distinctive and important aspects of administration is strategic planning,
the process by which an agency decides how it will allocate its human, legal and physical resources
in the fiture to achieve its goals.. . .Another important category of decisions . . . involves policy
implementation. Even in a situation where the agency is ultimately required to engage in formal
adjudication, many of its crucial decisions lie outside the adjudicatory framework. . . . It is notable
that the APA was drafted with regulatory agencies in mind and that scholarship and teaching in
administrative law have focused almost entirely upon such agencies.'They are, of course, enormously
important, but their staff members constitute a small fraction of federal employees, and their expenditures represent a correspondingly small proportion of the federal budget. Most administrators
work for, and most of the money is spent by, agencies that deliver services, generally through institutions.... Nearly all the activities involved in the operation of these institutions-all the planning,
budgeting, training, supervision, and actual implementation-presumably fall into the category of
informal adjudication .... Clearly, therefore, the APA offers few conceptual resources for controlling the manner in which these institutions carry out their functions and interact with the public.").
103 Id. at 126 ("Judicial interpretation has not closed this lacuna in the APA.. .. [T]he APA
simply provided no foothold, no conceptual framework, for imposing requirements on most actions
that lay beyond the ambit of rulemaking and formal adjudication.").
104 See, e.g., Seidenfeld,A Syncopated Chevron, supranote oo, 87-ro3 (describing the scholarly
debate about the significance of Chevron).
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relevant to the question of how much deference, if any, is deserved. 1 s An
important one is the formality of the action:
We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron
treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process
of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for
which deference is claimed. It is fair to assume generally that Congress
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides
for a relativelyformal administrative procedure tending to foster the airness
and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement o suchforce. Thus, the
overwhelming number ofour cases applying Chevron deference have reviewedthe
fruits of notice-and-commentrulemaking orformaladjudication.'"

This emphasis on formality is consistent with the Court's concerns about
administrative legitimacy and the fact that the APA procedures in rulemaking
and formal adjudication help ensure this legitimacy from within. But the
Medicaid SPA approval process does not fall into either category; in fact there
are almost no regulatory procedural safeguards in the case of SPA approvals,
and certainly no requirements that ensure public participation and vetting of
CMS's reasons for approving cuts. At least when a SPA is denied, states have
the right to seek an administrative hearing, triggering the formal adjudicatory
procedures required under the APA; but providers and beneficiaries do not have
a comparable right in the case of SPA approvals. As noted in Part I, implementing
regulations require states to submit assurances of § 30(A) compliance to HHS
when they submit a state plan amendment. But neither the statute nor Medicaid
regulations explicitly note what findings states must make to support their
SPA assurances, require states to submit any findings or evidence of support
to the federal government as part of the SPA, or require the federal agency to
review any findings or support for the states' assurances.10 7 In fact, the regular
practice, at least prior to the Obama administration, was for the Secretary to
10
rely on states' assurances without requesting underlying documentation.o
Perhaps more important than CMS's decision to approve cuts in a
given case is the fact that the SPA approval process requires CMS to fill in
crucial statutory gaps without the benefit of rulemaking or formal hearing
protections, which are designed to facilitate a thorough vetting of its statutory
interpretations and to ensure agency consistency of those interpretations over
time. CMS's decision that a SPA complies with, or violates, § 30(A) depends
on its interpretation of what § 30(A) requires states to do in order to ensure the
sufficiency of rates and to demonstrate equal access. Yet, until 2011, CMS had
failed to use its rulemaking authority to articulate and justify its interpretation
of the law. Indeed, the number of comments received by CMS when it finally
did propose regulations reflected considerable concern that CMS's approach
would not adequately enforce § 30(A) protections.
105 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-31 (2001).
1o6 Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
107 See Clark, MedicaidAccess, supranote 12, at 8oo-oi.
1o8

Id. at 8o.
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While formality is important, Mead does make clear that the absence of
formality is not determinative. The Court views the question of deference as a
matter of degree, where the amount of deference warranted may depend on a
number of factors:
The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has
been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the
degree of the agency's care, its consistenc7 , formality, and relative expertness,
and to the persuasiveness of the agencys position. [An] approach [which]
has produced a spectrum ofjudicial responses, from great respect at one end,
to near indifference at the other."

Thus, in contrast to the way the question of deference was discussed in
Independent Living Center, the Mead Court notes that deference is not

necessarily a simple yes or no question, but that the degree of weight accorded
to agency action varies based on the context and circumstances surrounding
agency action.o10 According to Mead, even if an action does not warrant
Chevron deference, it may still get some degree of respect under Skidmore,
a Supreme Court decision addressing the weight accorded to agency action
prior to Chevron."' In Skidmore, the Court held that the degree of weight "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."'12
This inquiry into the circumstances of CMS's approval to determine
whether it deserves some weight under Mead and Skidmore is missing from
IndependentLiving Center.The Court, in its dicta referring to Chevron deference,

acknowledged that "it may be that not all of the considerations that may bear
upon the proper resolution of the issue have been presented.""' The Mead
and Skidmore factors are precisely the kinds of considerations that the Court
likely had in mind, and which are explored in greater depth in the next Part.
III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF
INDEPENDENTLIVING CENTER

The challenges reviewed in Independent Living Center represent only a
fraction of the lawsuits brought in recent years to halt state cuts in California
based on federal law. Because of the preliminary injunctions repeatedly granted
by district courts and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit prior to IndependentLiving
Center, California legislators have made multiple attempts to cut rates. As
described further below, the latest round of cuts was challenged in a group of
cases decided by a California district court in December 2011 and January 2012,
109 Mead,533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
no Id.
in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,323 U.S. 134 (1944)
112

Id. at 14o.

113

Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012).
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and the cases were consolidated and ultimately heard by the Ninth Circuit in
Managed PharmacyCare.
Providers and beneficiaries brought four suits challenging these more recent
cuts in federal court: California MedicalAss'n v. Douglas,"4 CaliforniaHospital
16
Ass'n v. Douglas,n5 California Medical TransportationAss'n v. Douglas,1
and
ManagedPharmacyCare v. Sebelius"--referredto collectively as the "Post-ILC
Medicaid Payment Cases.""' The cuts challenged in ManagedPharmacy Care
were almost identical to the ones challenged in Independent Living Center in
that they targeted a diverse group of providers, including providers of skilled
nursing, physician, clinic, dental, emergency medical transportation, durable
medical equipment and supply, and pharmaceutical services."' But the process
through which these latest cuts were effected looked very different. These latest
cuts were enacted as part of Assembly Bill (AB 97), which contained language
expressly acknowledging California's § 30(A) obligations and conditioning
the proposed cuts on § 30(A) compliance.120 The Director of the California
Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), Toby Douglas, was authorized
to make this determination and, pursuant to this authorization, the Director
caused DHCS officials to undertake an access review as part of its rate-setting
process before resubmitting its SPA to CMS.
CMS also took an uncharacteristically active role in reviewing California's
SPA and requesting additional information from which to assess California's
assurances of § 30(A) compliance.121 On the surface, at least, California and
n4 Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Douglas, 848 E Supp. 2d 117 (C.D. Cal. 2012), rev'd in part,appeal dismissed in partsub nom. Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 E 3 d 1235 (9 th Cir. 2013).
Cal. Hosp. Ass'n v. Douglas, No. CV 11-9078 CAS (MALNx), 2011 WL 6820229 (C.D.
'5
Cal. Dec. 28, 2011), mod fied, 2012 WL 760646 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012), andrev'dsub nom. Managed
Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 76 F3 d 1235 ( 9 th Cir. 2013).
n16 Cal. Med. Transportation Ass'n v. Douglas, No. CV n1-09830 CAS (MANx), (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 1o, 2012), rev'd sub nom. Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 E 3 d 1235 ( 9 th Cir. 2013).
117 ManagedPharmacy Care,716 F. 3 d 1235n8 ILC is the abbreviation for the IndependentLiving Center case.
u
120

ManagedPharmacy Care, 716 F3d at

1243.

Assemb. B. 97, ZOn-12 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added) (focusing

on finding places to cut only "where reimbursementlevels are higher than requiredunder the standard
provided in [§ 3o(A)] and can be reduced in accordancewithfederallaw").The statute authorized the

Director to identify such opportunities for legal reductions and specifically prohibited the Director
from implementing rate reductions unless and until the Director (i) determined that the reductions
would comply with applicable federal Medicaid requirements and (2) were approved by CMS.
121 See Letter from Donald Berwick, Administrator, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., to Toby Douglas, Dir. of Health Care Programs, Cal.
Dep't of Health Care Servs. (Oct. 27, 201) (submitting two SPAs for CMS approval). CMS did
not approve right away; it issued a letter to DHSC requesting additional information concerning
the impact of the proposed rate reduction on access. In response, DHCS submitted access studies
and plans for monitoring access. CMS ultimately approved the SPAs in "succinct"letters noting the
"the data CMS reviewed, the monitoring plan, and [CMS's] consideration of stakeholder input"as
evidence of § 3o(A) compliance.The letter went on to note that "the State was able to provide metrics that adequately demonstrated beneficiary access" including the: (i) "Total number of providers

2013- 20141

APA DEFERENCE: A HARD LOOK

237

CMS officials appeared to take their federal obligations seriously. But after
the review, state officials concluded that a 10% across-the-board payment
reduction-the same reduction originally attempted by the state without any
process-would comply with federal law. CMS approved the cuts over provider
and beneficiary objections.
In each case, the California district court preliminarily enjoined the cuts
despite CMS approval. While there were some differences in the opinions
based on the specific services impacted in each case, the underlying reasoning
was essentially the same: the state violated federal law by failing to do
credible studies of provider costs to determine whether the proposed rates
were consistent with economy and efficiency per § 30(A) (the "provider cost
issue");12 2 and the state's access review was fundamentally flawed and thus could
not accurately evaluate the potential impact of rates on equal access or quality
guarantees in § 30(A) (the "access review issue").12 3 In light of these defects, the
district court refused to defer to CMS's approval of the cuts, finding it arbitrary
and capricious.
California and federal officials appealed the district court's decisions to
the Ninth Circuit, and last year, the Ninth Circuit overturned the decisions
and vacated the injunctions in Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebeliu.12 4 The
Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Independent Living Centerin applying Chevron

deference to CMS's approval.125 In light of the original question presented to,
and remanded by, the Independent Living Center court, it is important to note

that although plaintiffs brought challenges to the cuts using the Supremacy
Clause and the APA, the district court's substantive analysis focused on the
APA.The district court noted briefly in the opinion that the Supremacy Clause
may also provide plaintiffs a basis for challenge, but referred back to its APA
analysis for the likely outcome of that challenge.126 There was nothing in the
district court's opinion to suggest that the Supremacy Clause might provide a
less deferential standard of review than the APA or that the choice of claim
would change the outcome. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit
agreed that the APA governed the dispute, but they disagreed on whether the
SPA approvals satisfied the APA conditions for deference.

by type and geographic location and participating Medi-Cal providers by type and geographic
area," (2) "Total number of Medi-Cal beneficiaries by eligibility type," (3) "[u]tilization of services
by eligibility type over time,"and (4) "Analysis of benchmark service utilization where available."Id.
122 See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass'n, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-30.
123

See, e.g., id. at 1131-32.

ManagedPharmacy Care,76 E 3d 1235.
Id. at 1246-47.
126 See, e.g., Cal.Med. Ass'n, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (APA claim addressed at p. 1127, Supremacy Clause basis for action addressed briefly at pp. 1126-27); see also Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern
California, Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 E3 d 644, 656 (9 th Cir. 2009) (describing how "reviewing courts
typically subject state rate-making to something akin to'arbitrary and capricious'review"), vacated
sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
124
125
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A. Provider Cost Issue & Deferencefor Statutory Interpretation
The first issue implicating the deference question involved the parties'
dispute about whether § 30(A) required states to perform provider cost studies
before setting rates. Recall that § 30(A) requires states to set rates that are
consistent with economy, efficiency, and equal access to quality care, and SPAs
must include state assurances to federal regulators that rates comply with this
provision. Because federal regulators have not promulgated rules to define
this obligation, federal courts have been forced to interpret this provision in
determining whether state rate-setting methodology violates federal law.
27
As noted in Part I, the Ninth Circuit did this in Orthopaedic Hospital.1
In
OrthopaedicHospital,the court found that in order to demonstrate compliance
with § 30(A)'s substantive guarantees, state officials had to be able to
demonstrate a reasonable nexus between the rates and § 30(A) factors, which
it could not do without cost data.128 Based on Orthopaedic Hospital, rate
cuts had previously been invalidated because of a state's failure to do such
studies, so the plaintiffs in the Post-ILC Medicaid Payment Cases relied
on OrthopaedicHospital to show that provider cost was a relevant factor that
states must consider. According to plaintiffs, the state's failure to perform such
studies made CMS's approval arbitrary and capricious under State Farm.129
In justifying SPA approval, CMS relied on a contrary interpretation of §
30(A)-that cost studies are not required. CMS argued that its interpretation
was entitled to deference under Chevron because the statute was ambiguous and
CMS was delegated the authority to fill in this gap in the SPA approval process.13 0
If CMS's interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference, then under Brand
X, CMS's interpretation should control despite the Ninth Circuit's contrary
interpretation in OrthopaedicHospital 3 Thus the question of deference turned
on whether the statute was ambiguous, and if so, whether CMS's interpretation
in the SPA was the kind of action that warranted deference.132
There did not seem to be any significant dispute about the statute's ambiguity,
nor that the complexity and interstitial nature of the Medicaid Act made it the
kind of program in which Congress explicitly and implicitly delegated great
127 Orthopaedic Hosp.v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491,1496 ( 9 th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Department must
rely on responsible cost studies, its own or others', that provide reliable data as a basis for its rate
setting.... 'The Department cannot know that it is setting rates that are consistent with efficiency,
economy, quality of care and access without considering the costs of providing such services. It
stands to reason that the payments for hospital outpatient services must bear a reasonable relationship to the costs of providing quality care incurred by efficiently and economically operated
hospitals.").
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Cal. Med.Ass'n, 848 F. Supp. 2d at n30-3i (indicating that consideration of an
agency's reliance on responsible cost studies is a relevant factor).

130

Id. at 1128-30.

131 Nat'l Cable &Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
132 Id. at 980-8i.
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discretion to CMS to fill in the gaps. But the problem with the Ninth Circuit's
decision was that it did not look beyond this general character of the Medicaid
program and federal regulators' discretion. It ignored or dismissed too easily
many of the facts discussed in greater detail by the district court, which showed
that the Mead/Skidmore factors supporting deference-formality, agency care
and thoroughness in its consideration, consistency, and persuasiveness-were
not satisfied.
One glaring concern was the lack of formality in the process through which
CMS approved the rate cuts and asserted its interpretation of§ 30(A).' 3 ' CMS's
interpretation was not the product ofrulemaking or formal adjudication and thus
did not go through a thorough vetting process in which evidence or arguments
were considered and challenged by the interested parties most impacted by
this interpretation: providers and beneficiaries. CMS's interpretation appeared
briefly in a succinct letter to California officials announcing approval of the
SPA, which the district court found troubling:
Besides the fact that no explanation is given for not requiring cost studies
other than the statement that CMS 'be eve[s] the appropriate focus is on
access,' this statement by CMS suggests that its position regarding cost
studies is not necessarily settled.134

CMS's lack of explanation was also problematic because it was aware that

§ 30(A) had previously been interpreted in Orthopaedic Hospitalas requiring
such studies, so, at a minimum, CMS should have explained why it believed
that provider cost should no longer be viewed as a requirement. CMS relied
on BrandXs holding that a court's interpretation does not trump an agency's
subsequent interpretation of an ambiguous statute. But a court's longstanding
interpretation of a statute in the absence of regulatory rulemaking may still
help define the relevant statutory factors that an agency must consider in the
absence of any reasoned justification for not doing so. CMS's conclusory letter
simply did not evidence the degree of care, thoroughness of consideration, or
reasoning against which a court could examine the persuasiveness or validity
of its decision-indicia required to achieve even a lower level of respect under
Skidmore, let alone the greater deference under Chevron.
The persuasiveness or validity of its interpretation was further undermined
by the inconsistency in CMS's position. In 2004, CMS explicitly embraced and
relied upon Orthopaedic Hospitals interpretation of § 30(A) when it rejected
a SPA proposed by Alaska officials that CMS believed would increase rates.
133 The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'argument that a SPA denial should be treated as
less deserving of Chevron deference simply because it does not afford interested parties the same
opportunity to challenge the approval in a formal administrative process. Managed Pharmacy Care
v. Sebelius, 716 F3 d 1235, 1247 (9 th Cir. 2013) ("There does not appear to be any logical reason why
Congress would delegate to the Secretary the discretion to decide that a proposed SPA violates §
30(A), but choose to withhold from her that same discretion if she decides the SPA complies with §
3o(A). The nature of her authority is the same in both instances.").
134 Cal.Med Ass'n, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (alteration in original).
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It denied the SPA, citing Alaska's failure to justify the rate increases with cost
studies as required by Orthopaedic Hospital: "the requirements of [§ 30(A)]
are ... not so flexible as to allow the [State] to ignore the costs of providing
services."' This interpretation, adopted for purposes of denying Alaska's
proposed rate changes, was subject to more formal hearing procedures and
ultimately an appeal in federal court. Yet, in the letter accompanying California's
SPA approval, CMS provided no explanation for its changed position or for
why § 30(A) was applied differently in Alaska and California.
One of the benefits of deferring to agency action cited by courts and scholars
is consistency, and courts have repeatedly identified consistency as an important
criterion relevant to deference. If this criterion is absent, it raises the concern that
the agency is acting in an arbitrary manner, which undermines the argument for
deference and makes judicial review even more important. Only by taking a hard
look at such agency action can courts ensure fair and consistent treatment of those
impacted by the law-whether the interested party is someone directly subject
to the regulation or is a member of the group that the law is supposed to protect.
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit applied Chevron deference to CMS's
interpretation. It began by invoking IndependentLiving Center's speculation that
Chevron deference would apply to SPA approvals, though briefly acknowledging
that this issue was not actually decided. It said it would "afford 'considered
dicta from the Supreme Court . . a weight that is greater than ordinary
judicial dicta as prophecy of what that Court might hold.""3 6And it justified
this reliance, in part, on CMS's role in Medicaid program administration:
Arguably, the Supreme Court has already concluded that SPA approvals
meet the Cbevron/Mead standard by stating that "[tihe Medicaid Act
commits to the federal agency the power to administer a federal program.
And here the agency has acted under this grant of authority [by approving a
SPA]. That decision carries weight."'

The Ninth Circuit did not weigh this against the lack of formality surrounding
the SPA approval process and CMS's interpretive authority. The court relied
on Mead for the principle that formality is not a prerequisite for Chevron
deference, but it did not address the Mead/Skidmore factors relevant to
determining deference. It also failed to acknowledge Meads characterization of
deference as occurring along a spectrum, which implicitly requires a closer look
at the persuasiveness and validity of the agency's decision in order to determine
how much weight, if any, agency action deserves.' The Ninth Circuit simply

135 Brief of Respondents at 32, Alaska Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., 424 F.3 d 931 (9 th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-74204), 2004 WL 3155124, at *3.
136 Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 E 3d 1235, 1246 ( 9 th Cir. 2013) (citing United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
137 Id. at 1246 (alteration in original) (quoting Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern
California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204,1210 (2012)).
138 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228-31.

2013-20141

APA DEFERENCE: A HARD LOOK

241

presumed deference based on CMS's official authority and the complex nature
of Medicaid, ignoring Mead and Skidmore.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit relied on a different case, Barnhartv. Walton.139
Quoting Barnhart, the Ninth Circuit highlighted the following factors as
supporting Chevron deference: "the interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the [a]gency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the [algency has given the question over a long period
of time."'" The problem is that four of these five factors are so general as to
be almost meaningless as a guide for courts trying to determine deference
in any given case. They essentially do nothing more than reiterate the basic
characteristics common to most modern administrative programs.
The last factor, "careful consideration the [a]gency has given the question
over a long period of time," is the only one which requires the court to look
closely at the context and circumstances of the particular agency action, but
this factor was not applied by the Ninth Circuit in a meaningful way. The court
offered a generic observation that "[t]he executive branch has been giving
careful consideration to the ins and outs ofthe programsince its inception, and the
agency is the expert in all things Medicaid." But it did not consider the relevant

regulatory context for Medicaid SPA approvals specifically, nor did it consider
other evidence adduced by the district court that revealed a lack of careful
consideration by CMS in these cases. 14 1
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit's application of Chevron deference was based
on two salient characteristics: the character of the program as technical and
complex, and the "official"character of the act-that is, the express congressional
authorization for CMS to approve SPAs as an essential aspect of Medicaid
administration.142 But this approach reflects an overly simplistic understanding
of deference. The Mead Court affirmed Skidmore as a more practical and
reliable guide for courts on the deference question than conclusions about
whether a particular agency action is "authoritative" or "official."143 And it is
clear that the Mead/Skidmore factors demand a more nuanced inquiry into
whether deference is warranted than the one performed by the Ninth Circuit.
Justice Scalia dissented in Mead because he disagreed with this more nuanced
approach. He characterized Mead as "an avulsive change in judicial review of
federal administrative action" that weakened the presumption of deference in
certain cases, forcing courts to engage in a more active inquiry about whether
such deference is warranted.'"'Thus both the Mead majority and Justice Scalia's
139

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).

140 Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 E3 d at 1247 (alteration in original) (quoting Barnhart,535
U.S. at 222).
141 Id. at 1248 (emphasis added).
142

Id. at 1248.

143

Id. at 235-39.

144 Id. at 239 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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dissent recognize Mead as complicating the question of deference. Yet the
Ninth Circuit's application of Chevron deference, based merely on CMS's grant
of authority and without looking closely at context and circumstances of how
that authority was exercised, looks remarkably like Justice Scalia's preferred
approach-the one expressly rejected by the Mead majority.'4 5
B. Access Review andReasonedDecision-Making
The statutory interpretation issue discussed above was easy to address in a
certain respect because it focused the APA analysis on a specific factor-cost
studies-that if required would have made SPA approval a clear violation of the
law and thus invalid. The more challenging claim by plaintiffs was that the state's
access review was so defective that it could not support the state's assurances
of § 30(A) compliance, making CMS approval arbitrary and capricious. Based
on the Ninth Circuit's refusal to look too closely at the statutory interpretation
question about cost studies-a question that falls squarely within the purview
ofjudicial review-it should not be surprising that the Ninth Circuit appeared
even more reluctant to engage plaintiffs'challenges to the access review. Despite
the fact that plaintiffs identified several defects in the review, which the district
court considered in detail, this is the shortest section in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion. The court largely reiterated its earlier conclusions about the deference
due to SPA approvals, and itjustified deference based on a cursory consideration
of the SPA approval process.
As mentioned earlier, California officials collected and reviewed data to
determine whether this latest round of cuts complied with § 30(A) equal access
and quality requirements.'" It then re-submitted its SPA proposing essentially
47
the same rate cuts and the required assurance about § 30(A) compliance.1
CMS initially requested additional information from state officials based on
access concerns, but it ultimately approved the cuts. 148

145 Id. at 237-38 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) ("Our respective
choices are repeated today. Justice [Scalia] would pose the question of deference as an either-or
choice. On his view that Chevron rendered Skidmore anachronistic, when courts owe any deference
it is Chevron deference that they owe. Whether courts do owe deference in a given case turns, for
him, on whether the agency action (if reasonable) is 'authoritative.' The characterof the authoritative derives, in turn, notfrom breadth of delegation or the agency's procedurein implementing it, but is
definedas the 'officialpositionofan agency and may ultimately be affunction ofadministrativepersistence
alone. [But] [t]he Court ... said nothing in Chevron to eliminate Skidmore's recognition of various
justifications for deference depending on statutory circumstances and agency action .... We think,
in sum, that Justice [Scalia's] efforts to simplify ultimately run afoul of Congress's indications that
different statutes present different reasons for considering respect for the exercise of administrative
authority or deference to it.").
146 Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F 3 d 1235,1242 (9 th Cir. 2013).
147 Id. at 1241-43.
148 Id
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Although there is no legislation or rule mandating a particular ratesetting methodology, a framework for measuring Medicaid access has been
recommended by the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission
(MACPAC) in a 2011 report,149 and by CMS in its 2011 proposed rule on §
30(A) compliance.s 0 This framework established three categories for measuring
access: the level of physician participation, beneficiary need, and patient
utilization. It also included examples of the kind of criteria and data that could
be used to assess each category."s' The proposed rule says that § 30(A) requires
some kind of access review, and that the data used should reflect the reality
of access on the ground.'52 But the rule also makes clear that the MACPAC
criteria are not mandatory, and it repeatedly affirms the importance of state
flexibility and experimentation in designing the rate-setting process.1 s3
In the Post-ILC Medicaid Payment Cases, the plaintiffs alleged numerous
defects in the state's process that made the review so fundamentally flawed that
it could not yield meaningfil data from which to assess § 30(A) compliance.
While there was some variation in the evidence offered due to the specific
cuts challenged in each case, the plaintiffs' claims can be fairly summarized as
identifying three essential defects:
According to laintiffs, the Director's access analyses failed to include
[1] a meanin/ comparison of the Medi-Cal population to the general
population, [ any analysis of access on a localgeographiclevel [and] based on
the actual healthcareneeds of the Medi-Cal population, or [3]154any attempt to

project the rate reduction's impact on access to quality services.

The first criticism relates to the comparative nature of § 30(A) obligations:
rates must be sufficient to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have access to
services to the extent available to those in the general population. Plaintiffs
alleged that the state failed to present benchmark data that could be used to
compare Medicaid beneficiaries' access to those in the private market; without
this data, neither the state nor CMS could meaningfully compare access."ss
The second criticism boiled down to the claim that the state's data created
a distorted picture of access. By failing to consider beneficiaries' pattern
of utilization, according to their actual health care needs and with regard
149 MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 126-40 (2on), available at http://cnsnews.com/sites/default/files/documents/
MACPACMarch2onl...web-o.pdf
150 Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,359
(May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.ER. pt. 447); see Clark,MedicaidAccess, supra note 12, at 835-43
(analyzing the problems with CMS's proposed rule).
151 Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,344.
152

Id. at 26,344-45-

153

Id. at 26,344, 26,359.

F Supp. 2d 1117, 1131-32 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis added),
rev'd in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F 3 d 1235
( 9 th Cir. 2013).
154 Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Douglas, 848

155 See, e.g., id
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to practically relevant geographic groupings, the data would not present an
accurate picture of the reality of access on the ground."' Plaintiffs provided
specific examples of how the state's methodology created a distorted picture of
access in each case, but one example of this kind of defect occurred in analyzing
access to physician services. Plaintiffs alleged that state officials determined
the number of participating Medi-Cal providers by counting the number of
physicians who had submitted at least one claim to Medi-Cal per year, but that
they did not gather information about how many of these physicians treated
Medi-Cal beneficiaries regularly and what kinds of services they were willing
to provide the beneficiaries in light of their needs.1 7 Relying on submissions
of one Medicaid claim per year as evidence of a physician's availability
creates unrealistic and overly optimistic assumptions about physicians' ability
or willingness to meet beneficiaries' health needs throughout the year, as
demonstrated by numerous surveys documenting providers' refusal to accept
new Medi-Cal patients.'s
The third criticism-the state's failure to make projections about the impact
of rate cuts-reflected plaintiffs'concerns that the state was ignoring the explicit
obligations of § 30(A) for states to ensure rate sufficiency prospectively.The state
seemed to rely too heavily on a monitoring plan that would detect access and
quality problems only after they arise.s' Such a retroactive plan is particularly
troublesome because the harm that can occur-such as delays in access'
and loss of services' 6 1-may be irremediable. After careful consideration
of the plaintiffs' allegations, the district court agreed that CMS could not
demonstrate a rational relationship between the data and its conclusion of §
30(A) compliance, making approval arbitrary and capricious.16 2
The Ninth Circuit only briefly addressed these claims in its opinion. Rather
than address the district court's findings, it treated them dismissively. In fact, it
criticized the district court for "delv[ing] into the minutiae of the Secretary's
approval, picking apart DHCS's research and finding potential flaws-an
inappropriate exercise when reviewing agency action under the APA." 6 3 The
Ninth Circuit performed only a cursory review of the process noting the
"[h]undreds of pages of analysis submitted by DHCS," the interaction
between state and federal officials, and the fact that CMS seemed to consider

156 Id. at 1z32,1135.
157

Id. at H33-34.

158 See Clark,MedicaidAccess, supra note 12, at 785-88.

159 Cal.Med. Ass'n, 848 F.Supp. 2d at 1132.
16o Id.
161 See, e.g., Cal. Hosp. Ass'n v. Douglas, No. CV 11-9078 CAS (MANx), zon WL 6820229
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2on) (noting that insufficient rates could cause hospitals to close their distinct
skilled nursing facility units), mod/ied, 2o2 WL 760646 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2o12), andrev'd sub nom.
Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d i235 ( 9 th Cir. 2013).
162 ManagedPharmacyCare,76 F 3 d at 1243.
163 Id. at 125i.
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some "stakeholder input."1" The Ninth Circuit also seemed to accept CMS's
conclusions at face value: it found CMS's references to § 30(A) obligations
and MACPAC categories in the short approval letter to be sufficient evidence
that CMS considered the relevant statutory factors, without any inquiry into
whether its conclusions were rationally based on the data collected.'6 s

IV.

REINTERPRETING INDEPENDENT LIVVG CENTER

From Parts II and III, it should be clear that the Ninth Circuit's decision to
apply Chevron deference was not the only plausible interpretation ofIndependent
Living Center.Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit considered the most
recent California cuts approved by CMS in light of APA deference doctrine,
but came to very different results about whether CMS's approval warranted
deference. The district court found CMS's approval arbitrary and capricious
due to the state's failure to consider provider cost, CMS's failure to explain its
change in position about why this factor did not need to be considered, and a
number of other defects in the access review process that undermined officials'
conclusions about § 30(A) compliance.166 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
refused to look closely at the specific circumstances of the SPA approval. It
invoked Independent Living Center in applying Chevron deference to CMS's

statutory interpretation and SPA approval, despite the informal nature of the
agency action and the fact that the SPA approval did not satisfy the Mead/
7
Skidmore factors.'1
This Part delves more deeply into the theory of administrative legitimacy
and judicial review animating the Ninth Circuit's deferential approach and
interpretation ofIndependentLiving Center.Why did the Ninth Circuit criticize
the district court for delving into the minutiae ofMedicaid and second-guessing
CMS, instead of viewing the analysis as a product of the hard look that courts
should give agency action to ensure reasoned decision-making? In cases where
the nature of the act is informal, statutory constraints are vague, and potential
for abuse is significant, how does one distinguish an appropriate judicial check
on agency action from improper judicial policymaking and overreach?
This Part considers various theoretical explanations for the Ninth Circuit's
approach, but ultimately concludes that the district court struck the proper
balance in this case. The result of the district court's injunctions would not
have been to substitute its own policy judgment, but rather to require greater
explanation and a better quality of deliberation, which, in turn, should
promote better decision-making. This function ofjudicial review is particularly
important in programs like Medicaid that give tremendous discretion and
flexibility to regulators and states, not subject to the APA procedural safeguards
164

See id. at 1251-52.

165

Id. at 1250.

166

Id

at 124 3-44.

167 See id. at 1246.
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that promote administrative legitimacy from within. Thus, the district court's
approach illustrates why a more nuanced deference analysis and hard look
at informal adjudicatory actions is important for ensuring administrative
legitimacy.
A. Agency-ForcingTheory offudicial Review

At a basic level, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Independent Living
Center could be seen as consistent with an agency-forcing theory of judicial
review, as developed by Catherine Sharkey.' Sharkey has used this theory to
analyze the outcome of the procedural question in Independent Living Center,
but the theory is also useful for trying to understand how the Court's dicta on
the substantive question could be interpreted.
As noted in Part I, there has been a long history of agency neglect and
inaction-with SPAs proposing cuts either getting no review (and being
approved by default) or being rubber stamped by federal regulators based on
paper assurances of § 30(A) compliance. This pro forma approval of cuts has
been encouraged by the failure of federal regulators to use their rulemaking
power to provide meaningful guidance in rate setting. Without a clear statutory
mandate for agencies to act, courts do not typically have the power to force
agencies to do so. Courts' power primarily comes in the form of invalidating
agency action based on the grounds mentioned above. Where the statutes
regulating agency action are ambiguous, courts must interpret the statutes in
order to help them determine whether an agency's action complies with or is
inconsistent with the law; that is, unless the agency has already filled the gap.
Where such ambiguities exist, agencies can fill in these interpretive gaps.
In fact, the assumption is that where ambiguity exists, or some discretion is
required, Congress has implicitly delegated this task to the agency due to its
expertise and accountability to the executive. Once the agency decides to act,
deference is warranted if the agency is in fact using its expertise and discretion
within the constraints of the law-that is, not acting arbitrarily or capriciously.
Thus, an agency-forcing theory of judicial review views the threat of federal
court intervention to fill in these interpretative gaps as necessary when agencies
have not acted.
In this light, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Independent Living Center
seems to make sense. Historically, federal courts have provided the only real
protection for providers and beneficiaries against illegal state cuts in the face of
federal regulatory inaction, especially regulators' failure to interpret and define
§ 30(A) requirements, and their failure to conduct any meaningful review of
findings on which state assurances were based. And this was the context in
which the payment challenges in Independent Living Center were originally
brought. Although the Court did not give a reason for effectively preserving
168 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption as a judicial End-Run Around the Administrative
Process?, 122 YALE LJ. ONLINE I (2012), http://yalelavjournal.org/images/pdfso 7 6.pdf.
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the Supremacy Clause avenue in the absence of federal regulatory approval,
the issue of regulatory neglect had been prominent in the procedural and
substantive aspects of the initial challenge and was likely of significant concern
to the majority. If concern about regulatory neglect motivated the majority's
decision on the procedural question, then it makes sense that the Court would
view CMS's more active oversight and subsequent approval of the SPA as
legally relevant to the challenges. Under an agency-forcing theory of judicial
review, the agency's actions obviate the need for court intervention.
The problem is that this agency-forcing theory implicitly makes certain
assumptions about the quality of the administrative action getting deference,1 69
but the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Independent Living Center does not
address this qualitative aspect. For example, should a CMS approval letter
issued with no review-essentially a rubber stamp of state assurances-qualify
as agency action deserving of deference? The answer to this seems easy: lower
courts have previously made clear that such rubber stamping is not the kind of
reasoned decision-making demanded by the APA, and thus would not warrant
deference. This seems like precisely the kind of consideration the Independent
Living Center majority is referring to in noting an exception to the ordinary
presumption of deference. Even the Ninth Circuit in its Managed Pharmacy
Care decision implicitly rejects such rubber stamping by identifying aspects
of the rate-setting process (such as the amount of documentation, quality and
quantity of interaction between CMS and state officials, and use of MACPAC
categories and § 30(A) factors) that it believed evidenced a rational inquiry.170
The harder case is where an agency engages in some kind of process but
the process is defective in a way that seems to undermine conclusions about
legal compliance. The Medicaid SPA approval process provides a good example
of this because of the long history of regulatory neglect of access and quality
concerns, evidence of inconsistent interpretations of § 30(A), and structural
incentives that encourage CMS to prioritize cost cutting over access and quality
protections.These financial incentives have only intensified under health reform
as Medicaid coverage expands and the federal government bears primary
responsibility for the cost of expansion. In fact, CMS has recommended that
states under financial pressure to cut costs look to provider reimbursement, 7 1
169 For example, Sharkey argues that "[f]or preemption challenges ... courts should apply
a 'State Farm with teeth' standard in reviewing the evidence in the agency's regulatory record supporting the conflict between state and federal law."Id. at io (footnote omitted). She then suggests
that an agency's interpretive views should be subject to Skidmore factors. Id.at 10.
170 ManagedPharmacy Care,716 F.3 d at 1250-5x.
171 See MedicaidCost-Savings Opportunities,U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs. (Feb. 3 ,
2on) http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2onpres/o2/20o203tech.html; see also Sebelius outlines state
flexibility andfederal support availablefor Medicaid- FullLetter, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVs. (Feb. 3, 2on) http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/soupres/oI/20Ixo203c.html; Letter from
Cindy Mann, Director, Center for Medicaid, CHIP and Survey & Certification, to State Medicaid Directors (Feb. 25, 2ou) availableat http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/

SMDL/downloads/SMDixoor.pdf.
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despite studies suggesting that Medicaid is already one of the leanest and most
cost-efficient insurance programs around.' 72 Finally, California is one of the
federal government's key partners in reform-the federal government needs
California's cooperation and leadership just as much as California needs the
federal government's financial support.
CMS's primary role seems to be as financial partner to the states with a
focus on resource allocation, health system planning, and cost containment, as
opposed to a neutral regulator whose focus is on enforcing health care access
and quality protections.This conflict between CMS's different regulatory roles
in Medicaid rate-setting highlights the importance ofjudicial review as a check
on agency discretion or abuse, an idea affirmed by the Supreme Court in State
Farm:
Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but 'unless
we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding,
expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster which
rules with no practical limits on its discretion.""

Sharkey also embraces the role of hard look review, or as she describes it,
"State Farm with teeth," in her discussion of the role of judicial review on the
procedural question. 74 The risk that CMS will continue its long pattern of
abusing its discretion to ignore access and quality limits in favor of cost cutting
goals is particularly great given the lack of internal procedural protections like
those required for formal adjudication and rulemaking.
B. Supreme Court's Warning to Lower Courts:Misuse It and Lose It

The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Independent Living Center could also
reflect a more subtle, yet critical link between the procedural question about
plaintiffs' access to federal court and the Supreme Court's concern about
judicial overreach by lower courts on the substantive issue of whether agency
action should be respected. Richard Pierce explains this link, as well as the
dialogue he perceives between the Supreme Court and lower courts around this
issue of judicial review. 7 s Pierce highlights the role that federal courts should
play to ensure administrative accountability to the political will of the people

172 See LEIGHTON Ku & CHRISTINE FERGUSON, MEDICAID WORKS: A REVIEW OF How
PUBLIC INSURANCE PROTECTS THE HEALTH AND FINANCES OF CHILDREN AND OTHER VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 13,18-19 (2011), available at http://www.firstfocus.net/sites/default/files/
MedicaidWorks.pdf (describing Medicaid as "an exceptionally low cost insurance program"that is
already very lean and efficient and does not have much room for further cuts).
173 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 37, U.S. 156, 167 (1962) ((quoting
New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas,J., dissenting))).
174

See Sharkey, supra note 168 at lo.

175

See Pierce, supra note 87, at 1240-43.
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and believes that judicial overreach undermines this function.'76 To this end, he
is concerned about courts using judicial review to mask the improper secondguessing of agency wisdom:
[I]t is too easy for judges to assume inadvertently a dominant policymaking
role through honest efforts to perform any of the ... difficult tasks for which
they bear principal responsibility. The problem of judicial policymaking is
acute in judicial review of administrative agencies. Because agencies do not
have a direct, stepne relation to the people, judicial review can enhance
the principal-agent relationship between the people and agencies by
confining agency actions within statutorily-determined boundaries. Yet, the
temptation to engage in judicial policymaking disguised as judicial review
is great.m7

According to Pierce, as Congress delegates greater policymaking to agencies,
the Supreme Court has had to try to develop a doctrine that guides lower
courts as to their appropriate role. He views the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
as an attempt to construct "a democratic model of the administrative state" by
"reduc[ing] the power of federal judges to make policy decisions disguised as
judicial review of agency policy decisions.""'
The most interesting part is his interpretation of the dialogue occurring
between the Supreme Court and lower courts around this issue. He worries
that to the extent deference doctrine does not effectively prevent overreach,
"[tihe Court seems increasingly prone to solve this problem by restricting the
classes of cases judges can review."' 7 Pierce argues this is dangerous because of
the important role ofjudicial review in legitimizing agency action, and he offers
a cautionary note to lower courts:
[Lower courts should heed] Supreme Court precedents instructing them
to defer to politically accountable institutions .... [because] [u]nless judges
begin to take more seriously the Court's admonitions concerning their
limited role, the Court is likely to continue to select inferior doctrinal
solutions that confer on agencies broader discretion than they should
enjoy b insulating ever larger categories of agency actions from all judicial
review.7.

Perhaps the Ninth Circuit is viewing Independent Living Center in this
light. Certainly the threat of losing federal review of payments is real in light
of the demise of § 1983 actions, the Court's recent grant of certiorari on
the Supremacy Clause question, and the fact that four justices were willing
to eliminate this right.' 1 Moreover, the threat is still there, in light of the
majority's failure to definitively answer the procedural question. Independent
Living Center's reframing of the procedural question in light of its concern
176 Id. at 1239.
177 Id. at 1242 (footnote omitted).
178 Id at 1254.
179 Id. at 1243.

180 Id. at 1244.

181
(2012).

Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207, 1211, 1215
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about the Supremacy Clause being used as end-run around APA deference
implicitly links the procedural and substantive questions in a way that seems
consistent with Pierce's theory.
But as with the agency-forcing theory, this still begs the question about
how closely courts should look at agency action to ensure its legitimacy. To
the extent that a court's analysis of CMS approval is performed in the light of
increased regulatory activity under the Obama administration (access studies,
proposed MACPAC framework, proposed rulemaking, stepped up reviews of
SPA submissions, and a willingness to deny or delay rate cuts without more
information), a court would likely view CMS as exercising its expertise and
discretion in ways that should be respected. This is the perspective the Ninth
Circuit seemed to have, which explains why it criticized the district court's
analysis as "delving into the minutiae" of Medicaid and viewed its analysis as
this kind of overreaching against which the Supreme Court has warned.182
On the other hand, if CMS approval is viewed in light of the longer history
of regulatory neglect, the increasingly powerful financial motivations of
state and federal officials to disregard access and quality concerns in favor
of cost-cutting goals, and the informal nature of SPA approvals that lack
the internal procedural safeguards necessary for ensuring administrative
transparency, participation, and accountability, then one is more likely to
view the district court's analysis as the kind of hard look necessary to ensure
that administrative discretion has not become a "monster without limits."'83
C. Struggling withJudicialReview in a Post-BureaucraticWorld

The Ninth Circuit's approach might simply reflect its struggle with how to
apply traditional administrative law principles to a more modern conception
of administration. William Simon describes how traditional administrative
law principles were developed out of an older model of administration.18 4
This model assumes that legislative goals and political choices will and can
be codified in clear statutory commands and rules to be implemented by the
agency.8 5 Such commands and rules are expected to be easily understandable
and consistent over time. Simon describes judicial review under this model as
reflecting an "obsessive preoccupation with statutory authori[ty] and . . . rules
and rulemaking as . . . rigid constraints on administrative action."' 6 It relies

on a command-control model of administration set up primarily to ensure
182 See Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F 3 d 1235, 1251 ( 9 th Cir. 2013).
183 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29,49 (1983).

184 See William H. Simon, Democracy and Organization: The Further Reformation ofAmerican

Administrative Law 3-4 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 12-322, 2012).
185 See id.
186 Id at 4.
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that officials are following these rigid commands and rules. And while
Simon acknowledges that the law based on this model has tolerated some
unaccounted-for discretion, the expectation is that expertise will serve as an
important constraint on this discretion and judicial review as an important
external check to ensure statutory compliance.
The problem is that this traditional model of administrative law cannot
effectively address key issues of accountability presented in the more modern
administrative state. The modern, or post-bureaucratic, regulatory state relies
less on rigid rules or top-down commands that can be easily implemented
by an agency; rather, it relies on more flexible, performance-based standards,
expected to evolve over time. This evolutionary aspect can be particularly
challenging for courts because "implementation [must be understood], not
only or even primarily as compliance with previously enacted norms, but as
a course of discovery and elaboration.""' According to Simon, "[i]f change in
bureaucracy is episodic, in post-bureaucratic organization, it is continuous."
Moreover, the kind of expertise applied in a post-modern bureaucracy may
not reflect a static or clear standard or measurement; rather norms and practices
develop from the bottom-up, through experimentation and partnerships
that hopefully yield information about best practices or models that should
be adopted by others. In the modern administrative state, administrative
legitimacy is less about compliance with a clear rule and more about the process
by which agencies seek to achieve vague and multi-faceted statutory goals.
These kinds of administrative programs often depend on tools like written
plans and stakeholder participation to enhance transparency, accountability,
and participatory values that further administrative legitimacy.'
Medicaid, and especially the rate-setting process, is a perfect example of
this post-bureaucratic regulatory model. Since its enactment, the Medicaid
statute has relied heavily on the states for administration: Medicaid rates and
rate-setting methodology are not established at the federal level-rather, the
legislation contemplates and encourages states to design their own methodology
and propose rates they believe to be consistent with § 30(A) factors as these
factors are understood and applied at a local level.190 For example, California
and Arkansas have different health care markets, needs, and challenges that may
influence the rates they must pay providers to ensure equal access and quality.
Not only does the statute rely on vague standards rather than rigid rules or clear
procedural requirements, the statute had been amended a few times to increase
state flexibility to experiment with different rate-setting methodologies and to
specifically encourage states to experiment with financing systems that require
providers to deliver care more cost-efficiently. 9' The assumption is that the best
187 Id. at 14.

188

Id.

189 See generally id.
190

See Clark, MedicaidAccess, supra note 12, at 793-805.

191 Id. at 777-779.
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way to accomplish § 30(A) goals is to allow local experimentation that helps us
identify promising models for other states and even federal programs. Indeed,
this bottom-up approach was explicitly affirmed by CMS in its proposed rule.192
The challenge for courts, according to Simon, is that the command-control,
top-down model animates much administrative doctrine, and courts seem more
reticent to engage in meaningful judicial review of agency action characteristic
of the post-bureaucratic approach. He criticizes existing administrative law
doctrine as not effectively dealing with this model:
The courts' notion of justiciability seems constrained by the bureaucratic
view of organization. They are most ready to intervene in connection with
rules, which they tend to understand . .. as norms ... whether promulgated

by the legislature of the agency itself. When they encounter more general
and provisional norms, they have a harder time conceiving of a plausible role
to play. Then they often deny review, saying that there is "no law to apply",
or that they cannot risk disrupting coherent administrative practices, or that
they should not usurp legislatively conferred discretion. These reasons tend
to assume that intervention would take a compliance-type form.The reasons
often do not make sense with reference to reasonable-consideration-andexplanation requirements."'

We see evidence of this struggle with the Ninth Circuit's recurring focus on
the vague, complex, and technical nature ofrate setting in the Medicaid program.
This flexible and evolutionary approach seemed to create an uncertainty that
the Ninth Circuit found difficult to navigate. We also see this in the Ninth
Circuit's explanation for its willingness to embrace the state monitoring plan
as a method of ensuring access and quality despite defects in the prospective
analysis.19 4 Section 30(A) factors are not only vague, the court notes, but they
depend on inherently uncertain behavioral predictions about how providers will
respond to rates.' One gets the sense that the Ninth Circuit threw its hands
up at the task of trying to figure out how to exercise meaningful judicial review
in the face of such ambiguity, complexity, and uncertainty, without engaging in
the inappropriate exercising of policy making.
While this kind of agency action may complicate judicial review a bit,
Simon argues that the reasoned decision-making standard provides an effective
guiding principle to help courts navigate this challenge:
As illustrated by State Farm, the Court can, without guidance from the
organic statute, still ascertain that the administrator has exercised discretion
on the basis of generally appropriate public norms, that she has considered
the legitimate interests and arguments of stakeholders, and that she has
sufficiently developed and considered relevant evidence... . [M]andating
reasonable consideration and explanation encourages the administrator to
view her decision in terms of general plans; considering the decision in a
broader context is precisely what reasonableness would often entail. And to
the extent explanation makes
agency practice more transparent, it enhances
6
legislative accountability.'
192

Id. at 8o4, 844-45.
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Simon, supra note 184, at 23.

194 See Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3 d 1235, 1249-50 ( 9 th Cit. 2013).
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Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's criticism, it is not necessary to "delv[e] into
the minutiae" of Medicaid or second-guess the wisdom of CMS in order to
ensure that CMS engaged in reasoned decision-making in the SPA approval
process. The district court's concerns were not based on its conclusion that
Orthopaedic Hospital had a better approach to rate setting; it was based on
CMS's own inconsistencies-inconsistencies which raised fairness concerns
because no reasoned explanation was given. It did not require special expertise
or a policy judgment to identify the disconnect between the data collected and
the state's conclusions: CMS's own MACPAC framework makes clear that the
access data must present a realistic picture of access on the ground; § 30(A)
makes clear that the state must make some projection about the impact of rates
on access; and § 30(A) makes clear that the access requirement is comparative.
If the data used by CMS in its review could not be rationally linked to these
determinations, this is a serious failure evidencing arbitrary and capricious
decision-making that must be rejected by the court.
The result of this kind of review is not a substitution of judgment, but a
chance for the court to require the agency to do a better job of explaining
its decision. In the case of informal adjudicatory actions like SPA approvals,
this may be the only real opportunity to ensure the kind of transparency,
reason-giving, and evidence of expertise that enhances accountability and
administrative legitimacy. If a court only considers an agency's process and
reasoning at a superficial level-for example, whether the officials use "magic
language"from § 30(A) and how much paper is generated in the process-and
if the court relies on generic observations about the role of agency expertise in
program administration broadly, as opposed to looking specifically at whether
and how the agency used its expertise in a particular case, then we are right
back to the kind of scenario that made judicial review of cuts necessary in the
first place-rubber stamping by CMS based on paper assurances of § 30(A)
compliance. It is also worth noting that the complex and technical nature of
Medicaid rate-setting makes it highly unlikely that courts could use their
judicial review powers to substitute their own policy judgment because this is
not an issue that presents clear, value-laden options that trigger deep feelings
or would powerfully influence judges one way or another.

CONcLusIoN

As health reform implementation brings many more people on to the
Medicaid rolls, concerns about provider shortages are becoming more acute.
These concerns will grow as fiscally strapped states resort to an easy way to cut
costs-reducing Medicaid reimbursement. The Supreme Court's recent dicta
about deference for federal approvals of such cuts is already having a troubling
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impact on health care policy and administrative legitimacy goals, as illustrated
by the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in ManagedPharmacy Care.
The Ninth Circuit invoked IndependentLiving Centerin holding that CMS's
approval deserved deference, ignoring important limits on deference developed
in Skidmore and Mead and the district court's findings that CMS failed to
evidence reasoned decision-making. In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that
CMS's interpretation of § 30(A) deserved Chevron deference, despite the fact
that the manner in which this interpretation was articulated and applied lacked
the legal and de facto indicia of formality, consistency, and deliberation that
courts typically use to justify deference.
This Article cautions against this troubling interpretation of Independent
Living Center. Decades of regulatory neglect and abuse of discretion by federal
and state regulators, as well as the conflict of interest agencies face because of
their dual role as payor and regulator, suggest that this problem is not going away.
And evidence of increased regulatory activity by the current administration
should not make us complacent because regulators continue to exercise power
through informal agency decisions not subject to the kind of APA procedural
safeguards that govern rulemaking and formal adjudication. ManagedPharmacy
Care should serve as a cautionary tale of why action falling into the category of
informal adjudication should be subject to a more exacting deference inquiry,
and why CMS decisions relating to Medicaid access, in particular, should get
a hard look.

